period of two and a half months, being certified as fit for duty on November 15, 1955.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence defendant moved for dismissal, urging the absence of evidence of unseaworthiness on the part of the vessel and of causal negligence on the part of the defendant. The trial Court held that no evidence of unseaworthiness had been produced, but reserved decision upon the question of whether causal negligence was reasonably inferable from the evidence adduced. At the conclusion of the evidence for the defendant, a motion for a directed verdict was denied, and the case was submitted to the jury, which, after deliberation, was unable to agree, and was accordingly discharged.
In accordance with the provisions of F.R.Civ.P. Rule 50(b), 28 U.S.C.A., defendant renewed its motion for a directed verdict, and this opinion embodies the Court's decision upon that motion.
I am impelled to the conclusion that the plaintiff made out a case for the jury in deference to the views expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Schulz v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1956, 350 U.S. 523, 76 S. Ct. 608, 100 L. Ed. 668; Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1957, 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493; and Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 1957, 352 U.S. 521, 77 S. Ct. 457, 1 L. Ed. 2d 511.
In Schulz, supra, (350 U.S. 523, 76 S. Ct. 610) the Supreme Court predicated its conclusion that a jury might find causal negligence upon the fact that the defendant required the plaintiff 'to work on these dark, icy and undermanned boats' and that the discovery of the seaman's 'half-robed body with a flashlight gripped in his hand' floating in the water, justified an inference 'that he slipped from an unlighted tug as he groped about in the darkness attempting to perform his duties.'
The principle enunciated in each of these cases is expressed in Rogers, 352 U.S. at page 500, 77 S. Ct. at page 458, as follows:
'Under this statute (Federal Employers Liability Act) the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury * * * for which damages are sought.'
The standard of liability under the Jones Act is the same as that established by the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 51 et seq. 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.
In Ferguson, supra, the plaintiff, classified as second-baker on defendant's vessel, while engaged in filling an order from a ship's waiter for portions of ice cream, used a sharp butcher knife to loosen the solidly frozen ice cream from its container, the usual hemispherical scoop furnished to him being inadequate for that purpose by reason of the solidity to which the substance was frozen. In using the knife, his hand slipped from the handle to the blade, resulting in the loss of two fingers from his right hand. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that 'fair-mined men could conclude that (the shipowner) should have foreseen that (Ferguson) might be tempted to use a knife to perform his task with despatch, since no adequate implement was furnished him.'
A paraphrase of the language in which the Supreme Court has expressed its recognition of the existence of jury questions in these cited cases seems equally applicable to the case at bar.
I conclude that the jury might properly have found that the first engineer, as defendant's representative, should have foreseen that the operation which he directed the plaintiff to perform might require such speed as to induce the plaintiff to attempt to carry all three sections of water hose at one time, and that the weight and bulk of that burden, in combination with the plaintiff's effort to hurry and his slightly built physique, might result in the tripping and falling which occurred. If there was a jury question upon the existence of causal negligence at the time of the fall during the bringing aboard of the water hose, the subsequent occurrence of September 1, 1955, while the plaintiff was lifting another burden, would also constitute an appropriate subject for jury consideration upon the question of aggravation of the injuries inflicted in the prior occurrence.
The motion is accordingly denied and an appropriate order may be presented.
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