a complaint by the Secretary of Labor, the jurisdiction of the District Court over such trusteeship shall be exclusive and its final judgment res judicata.
Section 464(a) appears to afford two alternate remedies to one complaining of a local trusteeship, i.e., (1) written complaint to the Secretary of Labor and an action by him thereon, or (2) a direct civil action by a member of the labor organization in the District Court for appropriate relief. The subchapter deals with trusteeships. While section 466, which forms a part of that subchapter, provides that the rights and remedies therein enumerated and prescribed are additional to any others available at law or in equity, if the Secretary proceeds upon complaint filed with him, the District Court acquires exclusive jurisdiction over the trusteeship. I do not construe section 464(a) as providing two coordinate alternate remedies for the review of the trusteeship of a local labor organization. On the contrary, the procedure through the Secretary of Labor affords the primary and principal remedy for the individual member of the local or for the local itself. The authorization for the bringing of a civil action by a member or the local contained in the last sentence of subdivision (a) of the section is to be construed as a supplemental and accessory method of securing complete relief where appropriate jurisdictional grounds exist for direct action by the member against the labor organization. By seeking relief through the Secretary of Labor in the District of Columbia, pursuant to section 464(a) of the Act, plaintiffs will be afforded expeditious, effective and complete relief for any cause alleged in this action to which they may be found to be entitled.
The presently moving defendants have cited to me the case of Flaherty v. McDonald, D.C.S.D.Cal., 183 F.Supp. 300, embodied in an order of Judge Mathes, a copy of which is annexed to the defendants' brief. In that case the plaintiffs were officers and members of a local and the defendants were officers and agents of the international. The plaintiffs complained of a wrongful imposition of a trusteeship upon the local by the international. More specifically, during the existence of the trusteeship, delegates to international's convention to represent the local were appointed by the trustee, instead of being elected by the local members, local funds were being expended without accounting to the membership, and defendants were planning an election to local offices from which the plaintiffs would be barred as candidates. Reliance was placed upon the bill-of-rights provisions of subchapter II of the Act, -- no diversity of citizenship having been alleged. The Court there held that section 411(a)(1) of the codification did not specifically create a right to challenge removal from office pursuant to a trusteeship, or to be a candidate; and that subchapters III and IV of the Act dealing with trusteeships and elections afforded the District Court no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiffs' claim. Holding that the acts complained of took place before the effective date of the provisions of the Act invoked, the Court determined that said provisions could not be retroactively applied. The Court concluded that in the absence of diversity of citizenship, it could have no jurisdiction over a claim by local officers for loss of office control and management of a local union by the wrongful imposition and administration of a trusteeship by the international union and its officers and agents since such a claim did not arise 'under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.'
Because personal jurisdiction was not secured over International, the provisions of section 525 of the codification of the Act relating to service of process do not modify the service requirements previously reviewed.
Paragraph 10 of the first cause of action in the complaint alleges that 'this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the federal statute in such cases made and provided as applied to labor unions.' In paragraph 38 of the same cause of action plaintiffs allege that 'where vacancies exist in the officers (sic) of Local 1262, an election should be held under the direction and supervision of the Court in accordance with the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,' 29 U.S.C.A. 401 et seq. Paragraph 24(g) of the second cause of action recites the provision of the Act requiring every international to elect its officers not less than once every five years, either by secret ballot among the members in good standing or at a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot. The pleader then alleges that the defendant International is preparing for an election in 1960, which will be in contravention of this statute. Accordingly, the plaintiffs charge that unless this Court appoints a receiver or master-inequity, to supervise the International, the individual defendants will perpetuate themselves in power. Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that this Court has jurisdiction over International and of the cause or causes of action alleged against it, it is obvious that this Court may not and should not undertake, through a receiver, to assume possession of its assets and property located beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, or to direct International's activities beyond this Court's territorial jurisdiction.
I have not overlooked the remaining grounds urged by the defendants for the dismissal of the complaint. The principal cause of the plaintiff's dissatisfaction is the existence and conduct of the trusteeship of Local 1262. That trusteeship was created and the trustee appointed by the president of International acting under the authority of its constitution. There is also reposed in Suffridge discretion to continue the trusteeship and ultimately to pass upon the propriety of the acts of his appointed trustee, as well as upon those of the deputy whom the president authorized the trustee to appoint. Since this Court is without personal jurisdiction over the president of International or of the trustee of the Local, by reason of the failure of sufficient service of process, these two individuals, at least, are indispensible parties if the plaintiffs are to be relieved of the trusteeship or are to eliminate claimed abuses in the conduct thereof. This Court, in its discretion, may dismiss an action for non-joinder of indispensible parties and I find that such non-joinder exists in this case. See Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 1942, 316 U.S. 491, 494, 62 S. Ct. 1173, 86 L. Ed. 1620; Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union No. 103, United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. McAdory, 1945, 325 U.S. 450, 471, 65 S. Ct. 1384, 89 L. Ed. 1725.
Defendants charge the plaintiffs lack 'clean hands' in this case because after the action was instituted certain press publicity appeared incorrectly reporting certain phases of the litigation. Defendants contend that these inaccuracies are chargeable to the plaintiffs or their agents. I do not so find.
An order for dismissal of the complaint in conformance with the above opinion may be presented.