which provided that Hutcheon would take orders for the products of Titus in New Jersey, and would fill such orders by purchasing the merchandise from Titus at a discount price, and reselling it at a higher price to the New Jersey purchaser. Hutcheon was a New Jersey corporation, exclusively owned by an individual of that name. The action was for alleged infringement of the Copyright Laws and for unfair competition. Plaintiff was a New York corporation. Service of process on both defendants (Titus and Hutcheon) was effected upon the wife of the sole owner of the co-defendant Hutcheon in her dual capacity as alleged agent and sales representative of Titus and as secretary of Hutcheon, at the principal office of Hutcheon in New Jersey. In affirming per curiam the action of the District Court in quashing the service of summons as to Titus, the Court of Appeals concurred in the finding of the Court below that 'Hutcheon's status in its relationship to Titus was that of an independent contractor and that therefore Titus was not present in New Jersey in a sense that would support service of process. * * * It appears clearly that Titus has not maintained the minimum contacts in New Jersey necessary to warrant the court below in assuming jurisdiction of the foreign corporation, Titus.'
In discussing the general fairness test applied in the International Shoe case, supra, to determine the propriety of substituted service upon a foreign corporation, the same Court, in Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 1952, 342 U.S. 437, at page 445, 72 S. Ct. 413, 418, 96 L. Ed. 485, speaking through Mr. Justice Burton, used the following language:
'The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that state are to be determined in each case. The corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under state statute, make it necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a statutory agent upon whom process may be served provide a helpful but not a conclusive test. * * * If the same corporation carries on, in that state, * * * continuous and systematic corporate activities as it did here -- consisting of directors' meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc. -- those activities are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation to proceedings in personam in that state, at least insofar as the proceedings in personam seek to enforce causes of action related to those very activities or to other activities of the corporation within the state.'
The cause of action asserted in the Perkins case did not arise in the state in which the action was brought against the foreign corporation nor did it relate to the activities of that corporation in that state.
This Court feels bound to adopt the limitation of the International Shoe doctrine expressed in the Erlanger Mills case, in which, in the face of what appear to be similar facts, the Court said, 239 F.2d at page 507:
'Giving full scope to whatever liberalization results from the International Shoe case, the principle there declared does not, in our view, sustain jurisdiction in the North Carolina courts, where the only contact has been a single interstate shipment into North Carolina under the circumstances above recited.'
It will be recalled that the 'circumstances' referred to involved a contract of purchase of yarn by a North Carolina corporation from a New York corporation, and a sale in accordance therewith f.o.b. seller's plant in New York. The cause of action asserted in the North Carolina court arose out of the same single transaction. Nevertheless, service under a North Carolina statute generally similar to that of Indiana, was held insufficient to invest the North Carolina court with jurisdiction over the foreign, New York, corporation.
In the case at bar, defendant's telephoned order to plaintiff in Indiana, confirmed in writing transmitted by mail, and accepted by plaintiff by similar means of communication, although resulting in a contract between the parties, did not amount to such 'minimum contacts' by the defendant with the State of Indiana as to render inoffensive to 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' the maintenance of the Indiana action which resulted in the default judgment here sued upon. I, therefore, find that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction in the Indiana court over the defendant. Said defendant's presently pending motion for summary judgment in this Court must prevail. An order may be presented accordingly.