This is an action for the possession of lands.
On July 13, 1933 a prior owner of the premises conveyed it as a portion of a large tract to one Merrill. The description in the deed, which thereupon was delivered to Merrill and recorded in the office of the Morris County Clerk, refers to an "iron stake" as the terminus of the second course. On December 1, 1953 Merrill conveyed to Hosick, the third-party defendants, employing the same description. They in turn conveyed to Engroff on April 3, 1956. Both instruments were duly recorded. On June 20, 1955 the then owners of the tract conveyed it to the plaintiff, excepting the portion previously conveyed by Jelliffe to Merrill.
The action is based on the contention that the deed from Jelliffe to Merrill does not accurately describe the property then intended to be conveyed, but that the parties intended that a piece approximately 20% smaller in area should pass. So it is argued that the plaintiff is entitled to the ownership and possession of the land beyond the borders of the true close.
The first problem presented is whether or not evidence may be received of a parol agreement between Jelliffe and Merrill which is at variance with the deed description. Testimony of this nature was admitted at the trial but subject to subsequent consideration of its competency.
Merrill testified that in 1933 a meeting was arranged with Dr. Jelliffe to satisfy his desire to own a "little piece of land." At the meeting they talked briefly and then went down to the parcel and looked it over. It contained no improvements, although there were indications of prior occupancy -- stone walls, foundations and the like. Jelliffe agreed
to sell him a small portion and discussion of a water supply developed. There was a spring on the property and it was agreed that it would be included in the conveyance. It was agreed that a monument would be placed near the spring marking a corner of the property. Later an iron pipe was put down at that point. No measurements were made of any of the lines, it being satisfactory to both parties that the visual estimate they made be described in the deed as a rectangle 325' x 350'. The plaintiff also testified, over objection, to having seen this pipe in 1933 shortly after the transaction was completed. Parenthetically, it may be noted that the iron pipe is no longer on the land. When, why, or under what circumstances it vanished nobody knows.
It is urged by the plaintiff that this evidence should be received and be relied on as establishing the existence of a monument reflecting the contractual intent of the parties, and that the monument having been thus established should be controlling of the obvious conflict between the plotting of the property by use of the monument and the survey of it in accordance with the courses recited in the deed.
While it is true that extrinsic evidence is admissible where there is doubt as to the true location of a survey, Opdyke v. Stephens , 28 N.J.L. 83 (Sup. Ct. 1859), the rule permitting this showing is not without limitation. In Jackson v. Perrine , 35 N.J.L. 137 (Sup. Ct. 1871), it was held that where the language of the deed admits of but one construction and the location of the premises to be conveyed is clearly ascertained by a sufficient description in the deed in courses, distances and monuments, it cannot be controlled by a different exposition derived from the acts of the parties in locating the premises. In order to establish the validity of a parol agreement establishing a boundary it is necessary that a well grounded doubt appear as to the true location of the premises arising out of an uncertain, insufficient or inaccurate description in the deed. The rule permitting evidence aliunde to show the allegedly true location of boundaries sets down as a condition precedent to its operation the requirement that there be a latent ambiguity in the
deed description or uncertainty in its application to the premises granted. See Baldwin v. Shannon , 43 N.J.L. 596 (Sup. Ct. 1881).
The description here involved is unambiguous and the effect of the proffered proof would be to create rather than dispel an ambiguity. I am certain the rule permitting testimony aliunde was never intended to permit the accomplishment of so abortive a purpose. I hold, therefore, that the testimony of Merrill and ...