Findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Foley, J.c.c. (temporarily assigned).
The factual synthesis involved in this litigation is amply set forth in the prior determination of the Supreme Court 23 N.J. 85 (1956), in which this court was reversed for its denial of a temporary injunction. Except to the extent that factual issues are specifically referred to and determined herein, the facts in support of the plaintiffs' claim for relief as set forth in the Supreme Court opinion may be taken to have been either satisfactorily proved or stipulated at the final hearing and are adopted by the court for fact-finding purposes.
On final hearing I am, of course, bound by the legal conclusions embodied in the Supreme Court opinion. But it is my obligation to determine factual disputes between the parties which may affect the issues to be presented in subsequent review of the controversy by appellate tribunals here or elsewhere. It is also the function of this court to pass upon such legal questions as may not have been the subject of previous adjudication.
The area of factual disputation presented is to be gleaned from the three opinions filed by the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Burling, speaking for the majority, defined the issues as follows:
"1 -- Does the picketing involved here infringe upon any right of the employees guaranteed by N.J. Const. 1947, Art. I, sec. 19?
2 -- Is the picketing involved here immune from restraint by virtue of the constitutional right of free speech?"
The gist of the court's holding was that the constitutional article providing that:
" Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively. Persons in public employment shall have the right to organize, present to and make known to the State, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing."
dominated the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act (N.J.S. 2 A:15-51, subd. e).
The italics noted in the quoted portion of the constitutional article are in the hand of the Supreme Court and illuminate the rationale of the opinion, which I take to be, that the scope of legislative enactment ...