and in admitting to the truth of those charges, whatever may have been petitioner's opinion as to the type of offense constituted by such a violation becomes irrelevant in determining the propriety of the sentence.
Finally, if we assume that implied, if not completely expressed, in the third of petitioner's four grounds for his motion, is the claim that he was not sufficiently informed by his attorney, or by the Court, to enable him to acquire a full understanding of the nature of the charges embodied in the Information, the face of the record discloses no possibility, especially in view of the intelligent responses of petitioner to the Court's inquiries during the proceedings for reception of the plea, that the admissions implicit in his plea of guilty resulted from any failure on petitioner's part to understand the simple language in which the facts constituting the offense with which he was charged were set forth in the Information, of which he was furnished a copy and which he stated he understood.
Although whether petitioner was persuaded by representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or was otherwise led to believe that the offense charged in the Information to which he pleaded guilty was a violation of Federal law may be considered questions of fact which, under other circumstances, might call for a hearing upon petitioner's present application, they may, for the purpose of determining the preliminary question here, be assumed as true. In admitting the truth of the facts pleaded in the Information, petitioner rendered immaterial the nature and classification of the offense. The recital in the Information that the facts therein alleged constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 was mere surplusage. The factual allegations themselves presented a question of law for the Court's determination, and the Court found that those facts constituted a violation of the recited section of the statute. The guilt admitted by petitioner was not that of the violation of any particular statute but on the contrary an admission that he did what the Information alleged as a factual basis for the charged violation. Whatever, therefore, may have been petitioner's belief, spontaneous or induced, respecting the classification of the offense charged against him, that belief can afford no basis for collateral attack upon the sentence which was based upon the plea of guilt. Petitioner admitted in open court that his plea had not been motivated in any way by any representation on the part of the Court or on the part of the Assistant United States Attorney who moved the reception of the plea. In answer to the Court's question: 'Do you enter that plea freely and without any inducement by way of promise or threat?' defendant replied: 'Yes, sir, I do.' The Court supplemented this question: 'On the part of the Government or anyone else?', and the defendant responded further: 'Yes, sir.' The record (footnote 1 above), especially the last above quoted portions, refutes petitioner's presently asserted contention that he was persuaded by his Court-appointed attorney to plead guilty to the Information.
Insofar as petitioner now claims that the Court failed in its duty to impart to petitioner a full understanding of the nature of the charge against him, and to see that the attorney appointed to represent him properly protected petitioner's constitutional rights, the record affords no justification of a hearing in support of this contention. In this connection, the language of Judge Swaim, speaking for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. McGee, 242 F.2d 520, at page 524, supports the adequacy of what the record discloses in the case at bar respecting the sufficiency of the Court's discharge of its duty to the petitioner in the present case. Judge Swaim said, at page 524:
'Defendant insists, however, that his waiver of counsel and plea of guilty were not made voluntarily after proper advice and with full apprehension of the nature of the crime with which he was charged. Defendant's contention in this regard, stripped of its gloss, is simply that he did not know and was not advised of the 'independent contractor' defense. (The Information in the cited case charged embezzlement by an employee of funds of a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce.) But it is not the duty of the trial court to explain or enumerate for the accused the possible defenses he might raise to the charge against him. Michener v. United States, 8 Cir., 181 F.2d 911. The innumerable factual situations that might possibly afford an accused a defense to the crime charged reveals the absurdity of the assertion that to be valid the waiver of counsel or a plea of guilty may be accepted only after the trial judge had made known to the accused every conceivable defense that may be available or to determine from the accused that he has knowledge thereof. This would mean that a layman could not plead guilty unless he had the opinion of a lawyer on such questions of law as might arise if he did not admit his guilt. The plea of guilty here expressed defendant's belief that his act was proscribed by law, and that he could not successfully defend. Of course, a conviction based upon this plea presupposes a tacit disposition of the questions of law raised by the application of section 660 (18 U.S.C. § 660 upon which the Information was based) to the particular facts of this case. But there is no reason why defendant's admission of guilt cannot be accepted without more, since there is nothing extraordinary about this case which precluded defendant from knowing whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged. * * * Defendant does not deny that he wrongfully appropriated the funds, but complains that he could have successfully met the charge by proving that he was an independent contractor and had a proprietary interest in the money. This is not what the law contemplates by requiring that the accused is entitled to know the nature of the crime with which he is charged.'
In the matter at bar the voluntary character of the plea of guilt is not impaired by any advice or the results of deliberate cogitation which the petitioner may have received or indulged in during the period of his partial service of the sentence respecting the quality of the offense, the facts of which he had admitted by his plea.
Petitioner's assertion that the Court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence is apparently intended to relate to and be dependent upon petitioner's contention that the facts alleged in the Information did not constitute a Federal offense. This contention raises a purely legal question. The factual allegations in the Information, having been admitted by the plea of guilt, fit the offense charged squarely within the language of the Federal statute cited (18 U.S.C. § 2314) when read in conjunction with that of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). The Court finds as a matter of law that the Information did charge a Federal offense and thereby vested the Court with jurisdiction of it. The sufficiency of the Information to charge such an offense cannot be collaterally attacked in this proceeding. United States v. Kranz, D.C.N.J.1949, 86 F.Supp. 776, citing United States ex rel. Gallivan v. Hill, 3 Cir., 1934, 70 F.2d 840, certiorari denied 292 U.S. 642, 54 S. Ct. 778, 78 L. Ed. 1494; Smith v. United States, 10 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 768, citing United States v. Gallagher, 3 Cir., 1950, 183 F.2d 342, certiorari denied 340 U.S. 913, 71 S. Ct. 283, 95 L. Ed. 659; United States v. Caufield, 7 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 278.
I conclude that the files and records of petitioner's case in this Court conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief, and, therefore, that a hearing upon his petition is not required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This Court's written request to the United States Attorney for this District, to bring this matter on for hearing pursuant to the last aforesaid section is revoked, and the petition is denied.
An order may be presented in accordance with the views herein expressed.