UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
May 16, 1957
LISE HAAS, APPELLANT
GEORGE M. HUMPHREY, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, WHITNEY GILLILLLAND, P E A R 1 CARTER PACE, AND HENRY J.
Before EDGERTON, Chief Judge, and WILBUR K. MILLER and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
Clay, Constituting the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United
States, Appellees. 1957.CDC.67
Date Decided: May 16, 1957.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant brought suit in the United States District Court seeking a judgment that a decision of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission "be declared to be contrary to law and null and void, and that plaintiff's claim be declared to be eligible for compensation from the Yugoslav Claims Fund." The case is thus of the same general sort as was presented in De Vegvar v. Gillilland, 1955, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 228 F.2d 640, certiorari denied 1956, 350 U.S. 994, 76 S. Ct. 543, 100 L. Ed. 859. The District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss, on the authority of that case, and this appeal followed.
It appears that the plaintiff was not a national of the United States at the time the property in question was taken by the Government of Yugoslavia, and that the decision of the Commission denying her claim was based on that ground. *fn1 The plaintiff admits non-citizenship, but says that this should not be a "disqualifying obstacle" in this case for a number of stated reasons, of which the principal ones are that the United States Government undertook to release her claim against the Government of Yugoslavia; that this was a taking of her property for which the Constitution requires compensation; and that officials of the State Department, prior to the signing of the treaty, had taken the position that she should be included among the beneficial owners of a claim which the State Department had undertaken to support and to negotiate with the Yugoslav Government.
The decision of the Commission denying Mrs. Haas' claim is not - under the circumstances - one that we are permitted to review under Section 4(h) of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, *fn2 as interpreted in De Vegvar. We may point out, however, that the Commission seems to have observed procedural due process in the consideration of her claim, and that its conclusion that she was barred by the terms of the treaty and of the Act from participation in the Fund because of her non-citizenship can hardly be said to be based on an unreasonable construction of the law. Appellant urges, contrary to the Commission's conclusion, that her claim against Yugoslavia was in fact released by the United States. But that is something we need not undertake to decide, as our disposition of the case would not in any event turn on the point. The Government cites to us Section 3 of the underlying treaty, and interprets it to mean that inasmuch as Mrs. Haas was not entitled to the treaty's benefits her claim against Yugoslavia was not released and remains alive. *fn3 If that is so, there has been no taking whatever of Mrs. Haas' property. If that is not so, it does not follow that the taking - if any there was - can or should be compensable from the Yugoslav Claims Fund, unless and until there has been an award by the Commission. See Meade v. United States, 1869, 9 Wall. 691, 76 U.S. 691, 19 L. Ed. 687. In any event, it does not follow that this court is empowered to set aside the Commission's adverse determination. See De Vegvar (supra) and Dayton v. Gillilland, 1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 242 F.2d 227.
The judgment of the District Court will accordingly be
Affirmed. IN AGREEMENT
WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge (concurring in the result).
I dissented in De Vegvar v. Gillilland, 1955, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 228 F.2d 640, because I thought it was incorrectly decided. It stands, however, as the decision of this court and for that reason I felt bound to concur in Dayton v. Gillilland, 1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 242 F.2d 227. For the same reason I reluctantly concur in the result here.