at pages 567-568, 66 S. Ct. at page 325, 90 L. Ed. 318. This reasoning equally supports a denial of power in any court -- state as well as federal -- to invade the jurisdiction conferred on the Adjustment Board by the Railway Labor Act.'
And further, 339 U.S. at page 244, 70 S. Ct. at page 580:
'We hold that the jurisdiction of the Board to adjust grievances and disputes of the type here involved is exclusive.'
Counsel for plaintiff here relies heavily upon Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754, 85 L. Ed. 1089. In that case Moore, a former employee, brought suit for damages for wrongful discharge by the railroad in violation of a contract between the defendant railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. He did not seek reinstatement but money damages for improper discharge. The Court held that such suit could be maintained and that Moore was not required to seek adjustment before the Railway Adjustment Board.
Counsel for present plaintiff likens the present controversy to the Moore case, supra. In this Court's opinion there is a distinguishing factor. That is, that while the present plaintiff DePriest has ended his relations with defendant railroad as in the Moore case, the interpretation of the contract here will affect working conditions of present employees and may lead to labor strife, the very type of friction the National Railway Labor Act was designed to prevent. In the Moore case it was merely an interpretation of the contract in the face of the facts present in that case, the likelihood of a similar case being remote. Here there are many identical cases and many present employees involved. In the Slocum case, supra, the Court, referring to the Moore case, said, 339 U.S. at page 244, 70 S. Ct. at page 580:
'Our holding here is not inconsistent with our holding in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754, 85 L. Ed. 1089. Moore was discharged by the railroad. He could have challenged the validity of his discharge before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back pay. Instead he chose to accept the railroad's action in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such cases. A common-law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which the Board has power to provide, and does not involve questions of future relations between the railroad and its other employees. If a court in handling such a case must consider some provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, its interpretation would of course have no binding effect on future interpretations by the Board.'
The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the interpretation of this contract being one that would seriously affect the relations between present employees (other than plaintiff) and the defendant-employer is to be left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. However, should the Court go so far as to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?
If the interpretation of the pending matters on this question by the administrative body is against the claimants thereunder, is it binding upon this Court in the present matter? We think so, under the authority of the Slocum case, supra, and Newman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 3 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 560.
If, on the other hand, the National Railroad Adjustment Board rules in favor of the claimants appearing before it, does the plaintiff here have a good cause of action which might be lost or at least jeopardized by a dismissal now of this matter and a running of the statute of limitations which, incidentally, has been pleaded as a defense? The Court feels so, under the authority of Kirby v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra. To that end the Court will retain jurisdiction until disposition of the matters presently before the National Railroad Adjustment Board and the matter will be stayed until such disposition.
Counsel will prepare an order.