352, L.R.A.1916E, 572, and cases there cited.
'The United States in effect claims that the owner is entitled to no more than the value of the land, as of the date of taking, to be paid at a later time, when ascertained. The owner has been deprived of the land and its use since the taking, May 23, 1919.' 261 U.S. at page 304, 43 S. Ct. at page 356. (Emphasis supplied.)
'The requirement that 'just compensation' shall be paid is comprehensive and includes all elements and no specific command to include interest is necessary when interest or its equivalent is a part of such compensation. Where the United States condemns and takes possession of land before ascertaining or paying compensation, the owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time of the taking; he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with the taking. Interest at a proper rate is a good measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added.' 261 U.S. at page 306, 43 S. Ct. at page 356.
The whole theory of including interest as a part of just compensation comes down to the language emphasized above: the owner of property which is taken under the power of eminent domain is entitled to be put in as good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. Surely, where the subject of the taking is property of value in that it is capably of producing income or could be sold and the proceeds os employed, there can be no question but that if the property is taken today and its present worth is not paid until the termination of a condemnation proceeding ten years from now the owner will not receive just compensation, for in addition to the taking he has been deprived of the use of the property or its equivalent for ten years. It is essential to add something in order to compensate for the deprivation and to arrive at just compensation. Interest has become the accustomed additional ingredient. Albrecht v. United States, 1947, 329 U.S. 599, 603, 67 S. Ct. 606, 91 L. Ed. 532.
In the instant case the property taken, a portion of a public road, has no such value. The only loss to the owner, the County of Middlesex, is that it must provide a substitute road. Thus, the County has lost nothing by the deprivation here involved; in fact, the County has been relieved of the burden of maintaining the road for fourteen years. In this case the County did not proceed to construct a substitute highway and then seek reimbursement. See United States v. 1,433 Acres of Land, etc., D.C.D.Kan.1947, 71 F.Supp. 854.
The County cites road condemnation cases in which interest was allowed. United States v. Des Moines County, Iowa, 8 Cir., 1945, 148 F.2d 448; Town of Bedford v. United States, 1 Cir., 1927, 23 F.2d 453. But it does not appear that the question of whether interest was proper was raised in any of these cases.
To grant the County interest of close to $ 150,000 on top of the award of $ 172,000 for the construction of substitute highway facilities would seem inequitable as grossly in excess of just compensation.
In receiving the cost of substitute facilities the County is, in the opinion of this Court, being given just compensation for the taking involved.
An order may be presented in conformity with the foregoing conclusions.
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