involved commodities and there is no showing that they or other existing carriers are unable to supply all of shipper's reasonable transportation needs at points in the involved destination territory not now authorized to be served by applicant. Shipper asserts that it would continue its private operations if the authority herein sought is not granted. Whether or not the shipper elects to continue its current transportation methods is not basis for a grant of authority which would deprive existing carriers of the opportunity of transporting either actual or potential traffic which they normally expect to receive. In order to maintain an economical and adequate transportation system existing carriers normally should have the right to transport all traffic which they can handle in an adequate and efficient manner without the additional competition of a new operation. There is no showing here that the services of existing carriers are inadequate in any respect, and there is no assurance that the service proposed by applicant will be essentially different from that now available. In the circumstances, we conclude that, except for the return movement of empty pallets to Woodbridge from the destination points now authorized to be served by applicant, the application should be denied.' (Italics supplied.)
Although applicant admits that inadequacy of existing facilities is prerequisite to a certificate, Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., v. United States, D.C., 82 F.Supp. 153, affirmed 338 U.S. 802, 70 S. Ct. 59, 94 L. Ed. 485, nevertheless, the Commission found that opposing carriers could provide adequate facilities, transport the commodity, and supply reasonable transportation needs not served by the applicant, as hereinbefore demonstrated.
The applicant-plaintiff stressed two things among his many arguments. First, the alleged difficulty of handling the product of the shipper because of its nature and, second, the shipper's desire to have the personalized service.
The fallacy of the applicant's position on the first point becomes apparent to this court as it must have to the Commission by a complete examination of the record. Applicant introduced photographs showing the product on pallets, the loading by fork lift, the loading on trucks, etc., all in support of his argument for the personalized service that the existing carriers were not presently equipped to furnish. However, it does not take much imagination to liken the existing carriers' trailer equipment to the freight cars of the railroads presently carrying 75 to 80 per cent of shipper's freight. If the greater amount is carried in closed box cars what need for special equipment, and if there is a need for special equipment there is a complete failure of proof upon the part of applicant that such equipment cannot or will not be furnished by the existing carriers, and, to the contrary, one carrier appearing in opposition was found to have equipment available to handle the described traffic.
Secondly, in stressing the desire of the shipper for this personalized service the applicant-plaintiff has bottomed his argument on a false premise. The Congress has expressed its legislative intent in the creation of the Commission, that the Commission, through its expertise administration, establish a sound transportation system throughout the nation to meet the needs of the general traveling and shipping public not only today but in the generally foreseeable future. For the Commission to indulge the understandable preference and desire of the shipper for day to day personalized service would be contrary to the expressed legislative intent of Congress and would be to jeopardize existing facilities by ruinous competition and ultimately lead to chaos.
In the light of all the record, we conclude that the Commission fulfilled its duty under the Interstate Commerce Act and decided cases, requiring explication. As was stated by the Supreme Court in Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. United States, 1951, 340 U.S. 216, 227-228, 71 S. Ct. 264, 272, 95 L. Ed. 225:
'* * * As to the contention of appellants that the Commission's order is not supported by essential findings of fact, § 14(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14(1), 49 U.S.C.A. 14(1), does not require the Commission to make detailed findings of fact except in a case where damages are awarded. Manufacturers' R. Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457, 487, 489-490, 38 S. Ct. 383, 391, 392, 62 L. Ed. 831. The statute requires the Commission only to file a written report, stating its conclusions, together with its decision and order. This the Commission did, and the essential basis of its judgment is sufficiently disclosed in its report. Of course § 14(1) does not relieve the Commission of the duty to make the 'basic' or 'quasi-jurisdictional' findings essential to the statutory validity of an order. State of Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215, 51 S. Ct. 119, 125, 75 L. Ed. 291; United States v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 464-465, 55 S. Ct. 268, 272-273, 273, 79 L. Ed. 587. And the basic findings essential to the validity of a given order will vary with the statutory authority invoked and the context of the situation presented. e.g., United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 66 S. Ct. 687, 90 L. Ed. 821; State of North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 65 S. Ct. 1260, 89 L. Ed. 1760; City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 64 S. Ct. 327, 88 L. Ed. 400; United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 62 S. Ct. 722, 86 L. Ed. 971. Here the Commission found, in conformity to the statute invoked, supra note 2, that the differentials prescribed are 'justified as reasonable' and 'necessary and desirable in the public interest.' And 'the report, read as a whole, sufficiently expresses the conclusion of the Commission, based upon supporting data.' * * * Enough has been 'put of record to enable us to perform the limited task which is ours.' Eastern-Central Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 321 U.S. 194, 212, 64 S. Ct. 499, 508, 88 L. Ed. 668.'
We Believe that the report contains adequate findings to support its conclusions. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, D.C., 56 F.Supp. 1.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.
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