shop contracts with the unions. * * *' The court properly held that such conduct was covered and made illegal by § 8(b)(2). In that case, the court also referred to two other allegations that clearly were covered by the Act.
Thus, in all the cases relied on by defendants, every one involved a complaint allegation that clearly was covered by a specific section of the Act.
On the other hand, in the Weber case the Supreme Court of the United States summarized its decisions involving the delicate problem of the interplay between state and federal jurisdiction touching labor relations under both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. And in telling us where its decisions 'have brought us' (348 U.S. at page 474, 75 S. Ct. at page 484) the Court said at page 477 of 348 U.S., at page 485 of 75 S. Ct.:
'In Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, etc., v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154, the State was allowed to enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily injury and property damage to employees, obstruction of streets and public roads, the blocking of entrance to and egress from a factory, and the picketing of employees' homes. The Court held that such conduct was not subject to regulation by the federal Board, either by prohibition or by protection.'
The rationale of that conclusion is that Congress designedly left open an area exclusively for state control. That area includes conduct of the type traditionally within the meaning of the phrase 'police power of the states.' Such a rationale also applies when, as in this case, the employer asks this federal court to enjoin conduct nearly identical to that which the Supreme Court said in the Allen-Bradley case was not within the power of a federal Board.
An additional reason why this court does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the state court over the subject matter of this action is that the employer seeks the injunction against the unions' conduct. On the basis of the elaborate injunction procedure set forth in both the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq., 'it is hardly reasonable to suppose that Congress intended the District Courts to have general power to grant injunctive relief, at the suit of either unions or employers, with respect to any unfair labor practice that might exist, while limiting with such meticulous care the cases in which those courts might grant injunctive relief upon petition of the Labor Board or the Attorney General acting under the direction of the President.' Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 4 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 183, 187. (Emphasis supplied.) This case was cited and quoted at length with approval in Walker v. United Mine Workers of America, D.C.Pa.1952, 105 F.Supp. 608; to the same effect see, Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. Anderson, D.C.Mo.1955, 127 F.Supp. 692 and American Optical Co. v. Andert, D.C., 108 F.Supp. 252, 254.
In view of the fact that defendants have not shown the court any authority to support the argument that the specific conduct complained of by the employer is specifically covered by any section of the Taft-Hartley Act or any other Federal Act; plus the fact that the latest Supreme Court interpretation of existing law and the rationale thereof is that under both the Taft-Hartley Act and the Wagner Act such conduct is not subject to any federal regulation; and the court having found persuasive federal cases holding that a federal court does not have jurisdiction to hear a complaint by an employer for an injunction against the conduct herein alleged; therefore, this court concludes it has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and the case will be remanded to the state court where it originated.
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