alleged settlement constituted an accord and satisfaction and that it therefore has no obligation to return the $ 10,785.93. Additionally, defendant has filed a counterclaim for $ 4,661.58, the amount of credit given by the Government in its letter of April 3, 1950, alleging that this amount is still due and owing to the defendant.
Sections 203(a), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 923(a) and 204(a), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 924(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 govern the procedure for administrative and judicial review of administrative decisions. Judicial review of administrative orders is vested exclusively in the Emergency Court of Appeals. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 924(d).
The letters from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the defendant, dated March 6, 1947, and April 3, 1950, which determined that defendant's subsidy claim for June 1946 was invalid, constituted orders within the meaning of the Act. Armour & Co. v. R.F.C., Em.App.1942, 162 F.2d 918; Merchants Packing Co. v. R.F.C., Em.App., 176 F.2d 908.
The validity of such orders could only be considered by the Emergency Court of Appeals, no other federal court having jurisdiction in this regard. Yakus v. United States, 1944, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834; See Riverview Packing Co. v. R.F.C., 3 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 361, 368.
Defendant, however, advances the proposition that the defense of accord and satisfaction may properly be raised have and that such defense does not constitute an attack upon the validity of an administrative order. This might be true if only the letter order of March 6, 1947 were under consideration here. Such is not the case. The letter order of April 3, 1950, issued from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the defendant well after the transactions which are alleged to constitute a settlement and to establish an accord and satisfaction. That letter order stands as a tacit repudiation of any such settlement. Since it constituted an order of the agency, it could only be reviewed by the appropriate procedure as set forth in the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 924(a). By Reconstruction Finance Corporation Regulation No. 11 (15 F.R. 6193), December 15, 1950, was set as the deadline for the filing of protests under the Act. Defendant's failure to file a timely protest has caused its remedy to lapse. The letter order of April 3, 1950 must be treated as a valid order by this court. Accordingly, the contents of that order, establishing that as of that date the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of $ 7,041.60, are binding.
Defendant also alleges that it is entitled to extra compensation subsidy claims in the amount of $ 120,191.82. The counterclaim includes a prayer in that amount. In this regard, however, the facts show that defendant petitioned for that amount on October 27, 1950, and that the petition was treated as a protest and denied by a letter dated December 19, 1950. At that time the appropriate procedure dictated that judicial review be sought under Section 204(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 924(a), which vested sole jurisdiction in the Emergency Court of Appeals. Defendant failed to avail itself of that remedy within the prescribed period of time and is now precluded from attacking the determination of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Amodio v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., Em.App.1951, 191 F.2d 862.
The motion of the plaintiff seeking summary judgment on the complaint and dismissal of the counterclaim will be granted and an order should be settled in conformity herewith.
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