the same for incidental personal purposes, all within a certain area, the car might be said to be furnished for regular use within that area. But when a car thus furnished for such a use is driven to a distant point on one occasion, with the special permission of the one furnishing the car, that particular use would hardly seem to be a 'regular use' of the car. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that such a use on a particular occasion, which is a departure from the customary use for which the car is furnished, is a regular use within the meaning of these clauses of the policies.'
The purpose of this extended coverage is succinctly stated by Judge Chesnut, U.S.D.C. of Maryland, in Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 92 F.Supp. 620, at page 623:
'The general purpose and effect of this provision of the policy is to give coverage to the insured while engaged in the only infrequent or merely casual use of an automobile other than the one described in the policy, but not to cover him against personal liability with respect to his use of another automobile which he frequently uses or has the opportunity to do so.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The United States Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in sustaining the action of the District Court in dismissing the application of the insurance company in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 6 Cir., 204 F.2d 821, 825, where the son who was the insured in question was driving the father in the father's car with the father's permission, said:
'In our judgment, it is reasonable and just to hold the insurer in the policy under construction liable to the insured, who was, at the time of the accident, operating his father's car -- not as a part of the regular, frequent, or customary use, but only by special permission on a particular occasion.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The signposts that are indicated to this Court from the foregoing are:
1. Was the use of the car in question made available most of the time to the insured?
2. Did the insured make more than mere occasional use of the car?
3. Did the insured need to obtain permission to use the car or had that been granted by blanket authority?
4. Was there a purpose for the use of the car in the permission granted or by the blanket authority and was it being used for such purpose?
5. Was it being used in the area where such car would be expected to be used?
An examination of the facts of the present case discloses the following:
As has been stated, Marr was the Agent in Charge of the Philadelphia Customs Office. There were four additional agents under his supervision. The area covered by his office was roughly described as the Delaware River waterfront on both sides of the river from Wilmington, Delaware on the South, to Trenton, New Jersey on the North. Four Government cars were assigned to the Philadelphia office for Government work under Marr's supervision, of which the Ford in question was one. These cars were maintained on a pool basis and any of the agents, including Marr, could use any of the cars at any time as Government work required. The keys were left in the cars if they were in the garage for the convenience of the garage attendant, otherwise the keys were placed on the top of a desk in the office for everyone's use. The other agents used the cars more than Marr because the nature of his work was more supervisory. He had driven one or more of the cars of the pool about fifty times between January 1, 1951 and the time of the accident, October 24, 1951, according to his best estimate. No records were kept or produced. One of the agents under Marr lived in the same neighborhood in Haddonfield, New Jersey and if he was taking a Government car home in the evening, so as to be accessible for night calls or morning inspection of some of the piers on the Jersey side, this agent would take Marr home, otherwise Marr went home by public transportation except on a few occasions when it was necessary for him to take the car home on Government business. On the night in question Marr had been using the Government Ford in Philadelphia with another agent. He dropped the other agent off at the office and started home in the Ford. It was necessary to take the Ford on this occasion because the agent who sometimes took him home was assigned to go the next morning to the seashore area to investigate some cases and would not be going to Philadelphia. Marr had to be available for night calls from the riverfront and, if anything arose, to have a car available for the business that needed attention. It was on his way home to Haddonfield, New Jersey that the accident in question arose.
We, therefore, come to consider the signposts and to what conclusion they point:
1. Was the use of the car in question made available at most of the time to the insured? Not only must this be answered in the affirmative but in addition other Government cars were available for his use such as the Collector of Customs or the Narcotics Bureau (transcript page 26), if all of the four cars were being used by the other agents and Marr needed a car.
2. Did the insured make more than mere occasional use? It is felt that fifty times in ten months is a little more than occasional to say the least.
3. Did the insured need to obtain permission to use the car? Obviously not.
4. Was the car being used for business purposes for which authority had been granted? Yes.
5. Was it being used in the area where it would be expected to be used? Yes.
It, therefore, becomes clear to this Court that at the time and place in question the car was one 'furnished for regular use' to Marr and, consequently, within the exclusion provision of Article VI of the policy. As a result of this finding and conclusion by the Court the plaintiff company will have judgment in its favor.
Counsel may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon the failure of counsel to so comply, the foregoing opinion shall be considered the fulfillment of Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., and be findings of fact and conclusions of law.