Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


decided: April 5, 1954.



Warren, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Minton; Black and Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

Author: Frankfurter

[ 347 U.S. Page 299]

 MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole question for decision in this case is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act to submit a plan of reorganization to a district court whereby a debtor railroad would be compelled to merge with another railroad having no prior connection with the debtor. Answer to this problem depends on understanding of a long legislative history. First, however, it is necessary to put the problem into its relevant context.

[ 347 U.S. Page 300]

     In August of 1931, the Florida East Coast Railway was thrown into equity receivership. It operated in this manner until January of 1941, when a committee representing the owners of a substantial portion of the debtor's principal bond issue filed a petition for reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The petition was approved by the court, and, as provided in the statute, proceedings were initiated before the Interstate Commerce Commission for hearings on a plan of reorganization formulated by the bondholders' committee.

In the course of the next ten years, many proposals have been considered by the Commission. Most of them were rejected for one reason or another, but three have in turn been certified by it to the District Court. None has as yet been confirmed by that court. The initial plan provided for a simple internal reorganization. It was rejected by the court, and the case was remanded to the Commission with directions to take account of an intervening improvement in the debtor's cash position. 52 F.Supp. 420. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, the present respondent, first appeared on the scene in November 1944 when, after the Commission's hearings for the purpose of devising a second plan had been closed, one Lynch, joined by other bondholders of the debtor, sought to reopen the proceedings for the purpose of proposing a new plan whereby each recipient of stock in the reorganized debtor would be required to sell 60% of his interest at par to Atlantic, a connecting carrier, thereby giving that railroad operating control of the debtor. On November 30, 1944, Atlantic was allowed to intervene before the Commission in support of the Lynch proposal. The St. Joe Paper Co., on the other hand, which had by that time acquired a majority interest in the debtor's principal bond issue, opposed the Lynch plan. The Commission rejected

[ 347 U.S. Page 301]

     the Lynch proposal, indicating that, in view of Atlantic's operating deficits over the past years, combining the two railroads would not be in the public interest at that time. 261 I. C. C. 151, 187.

The subsequent struggle for control of the debtor has been largely between these two interests -- the St. Joe Paper Co., owner of the major interest in the debtor, and Atlantic, a connecting carrier anxious to acquire the debtor's coveted Florida east coast traffic from Jacksonville to Miami. Shortly after the Commission's rejection of the Lynch plan, Atlantic proposed its own plan providing for the merger of the debtor into Atlantic in return for the distribution of cash and various types of Atlantic's securities to the debtor's bondholders. St. Joe again opposed, as did various other bondholders, two competitors of Atlantic, an association representing the debtor's employees, and other interested parties. The matter was referred to an Examiner who, after a lengthy investigation, found that such a merger would not be in the public interest, and that the Atlantic plan would not constitute "fair and equitable" treatment for all the unwilling bondholders who were in substance the owners of the debtor railroad.*fn1 The Commission, however, by a sharply divided decision overruled the Examiner and sanctioned

[ 347 U.S. Page 302]

     a "forced merger."*fn2 267 I. C. C. 295.*fn3 Circuit Judge Sibley, sitting in the District Court, set the plan aside on the ground that the Commission had no power under the statute to force a merger; in addition, he held the plan not "fair and equitable." 81 F.Supp. 926. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, two judges sustained the Commission's authority to propose such a plan while the third agreed with Judge Sibley; but a majority agreed with the District Court that the plan was not "fair and equitable." 179 F.2d 538.

The Commission then formulated another plan, which likewise provided for a forced merger of the debtor and Atlantic, 282 I. C. C. 81, and Circuit Judge Strum, sitting in the District Court, while bound on the question of the Commission's power by the prior Court of Appeals decision, again set the plan aside as unfair and inequitable. 103 F.Supp. 825. The Court of Appeals was now convened en banc. Three of its judges, without further consideration of the Commission's power, reversed the District Court and found the plan fair and equitable. The other two judges dissented and adopted the reasoning of Judge Sibley in the earlier case, i. e., that the Commission had no power under the statute to propose such a compelled merger plan.*fn4 201 F.2d 325.

[ 347 U.S. Page 303]

     Because of the importance of this question in the administration of § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, we granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 948.

The procedure by which the Commission is authorized to consider and approve a plan of reorganization and then submit it to the interested parties for acceptance, as well as the courts for judicial confirmation, is governed by an elaborate statutory scheme. See § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 Stat. 1474, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 205. Any question such as the one now here must be resolved by reference to this governing law and its underlying purpose, imbedded as that is not merely in the formal words of the statute but in the history which gives them meaning. If ever a long course of legislation is to be treated as an organic whole, whose parts are not disjecta membra, this is true of § 77.

The respondent relies on subsection (b)(5) to sustain the Commission's power to submit a forced merger plan of the type here involved.*fn5 This was subsection (b)(3) of the original § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act as enacted in 1933, 47 Stat. 1474, 1475. It then read, insofar as here material,

"(b) A plan of reorganization within the meaning of this section . . . (3) shall provide adequate means for the execution of the plan, which may, so far as may be consistent with the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended, include . . . the merger of the debtor with any other railroad corporation . . . ."

The permissive merger provision in plans of reorganization was thus made expressly conditional on compliance with the requirements of §§ 1 and 5 of the Interstate

[ 347 U.S. Page 304]

     Commerce Act. The reason for this proviso, commonly referred to as the "consistency clause," was stated as follows by Commissioner Joseph Eastman, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Interstate Commerce Commission and one of the weightiest voices before Congress on railroad matters:*fn6

" Explanation. -- This act ought not to authorize railroad mergers . . . which are inconsistent with the applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, particularly the consolidation-plan provisions. These amendments are intended to avoid that possibility."

In the ensuing floor debates it was further made clear that the purpose of the consistency clause was to subject mergers under § 77 to whatever restrictions obtained for mergers under the Interstate Commerce Act. Representative Hatton Sumners, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee which had reported out the bill and floor manager of the bill, gave this assurance:

"Mr. HORR. May I inquire whether or not, where the word 'reorganization' is used, the gentleman is of the opinion that this would encourage consolidations of railroads?

"Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. They could not be consolidated in violation of the interstate commerce act.

"Mr. HORR. They would first have to go through that?

"Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. They would first have to go through that." 76 Cong. Rec. 2909.

[ 347 U.S. Page 305]

     And Congressman Rayburn, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, put it thus:

"Fear has been expressed that with the enactment of this bill the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts over consolidations and mergers would be expanded. It is my firm conviction that this proposal in specific provisions safeguards the present consolidation and merger provisions of the interstate commerce act and gives no additional authority to the commission or the courts in these matters." 76 Cong. Rec. 2917-2918.

In view of this deliberate and explicit incorporation of the restrictions attending mergers under the Interstate Commerce Act into § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, it is necessary to give some consideration to the merger and consolidation provisions of the former, 49 U. S. C. § 5. The history of these provisions is long and tortuous; its detailed summary is relegated to an appendix, post, p. 315. Suffice it to say here that one clear thread which runs through a course of legislation extending over a period of twenty years, as well as through the various commentaries upon it, is that only mergers voluntarily initiated by the participating carriers are encompassed by that statute and sanctioned by it. From the initial enactment in the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 480, to the most recent comprehensive re-examination of these provisions in the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, 905, Congress has consistently and insistently denied the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to take the initiative in getting one railroad to turn over its properties to another railroad in return for assorted securities of the latter. The role of the Commission in this regard has traditionally been confined to approving or disapproving mergers proposed by the railroads to be merged. And this adamant position taken by Congress has not

[ 347 U.S. Page 306]

     been for want of attempts to secure relaxation. Advocacy of giving the Commission power to propose and enforce mergers has been steady and, at times, strong, but it has consistently failed in Congress.

The reasons for this hostility to mergers imposed by the Commission derive largely from the disadvantages attributed by Congress to such far-reaching corporate revampings. Employees of the constituent railroads would, it has been feared, almost certainly be adversely affected. Shippers and communities adequately served by railroad A may suddenly find themselves unfavorably dependent upon railroad B. Investors in one railroad would, contrary to their expectations, find their holdings transmuted into securities of a different railroad. As the Commission in its 1938 Annual Report said of consolidations:

"Projects of this character cannot be crammed down the throats of those who must carry them out or conform to them. Legal compulsion can be used with advantage to bring recalcitrants and stragglers into line, but not to drive hostile majorities into action." (P. 23.)*fn7

We therefore conclude that the Commission does not have under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act a power which Congress has repeatedly denied it under the Interstate Commerce Act, namely to initiate the merger or consolidation of two railroads. In light of the continuously and vehemently reiterated policy against endowing the ICC with such a power under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, it is inconceivable, wholly apart from the consistency clause, that such was the sub silentio effect of § 77, an emergency statute hurriedly enacted with scarcely any debate. The consistency clause serves but to strengthen

[ 347 U.S. Page 307]

     this natural presumption against such a tacit grant. It would require unambiguous language indeed to accomplish a contrary result; yet nowhere in the committee reports and the debates on the original § 77, nor in any of the legislative materials relating to the thorough re-examination of that statute in 1935,*fn8 can we find so much as one word which conveys the impression that as to mergers under the Bankruptcy Act, Congress stealthily

[ 347 U.S. Page 308]

     designed to jettison its long-standing and oft-reiterated policy against compulsory mergers. On the contrary, after the enactment of § 77 in 1933, the Commission in its annual reports, and the Federal Coordinator of Transportation in his several reports, had frequent occasion to discuss § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act and § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. It would indeed be strange for these railroad authorities to bemoan the Commission's inability to initiate mergers and consolidations*fn9 if it had been a fact that as to the substantial portion of the Nation's railroad mileage then in receivership or § 77 proceedings*fn10 the Commission clearly had this very power. Had it been the declared intention of the drafters of § 77 to confer such a power, it is fair to assume that, in view of the persistent opposition of organized labor and other groups

[ 347 U.S. Page 309]

     to such attempts under the Commerce Act,*fn11 the statute would not have passed.

All this of course is not to say that mergers cannot be carried out in the course of a § 77 reorganization. It merely means that if they are, they must be consummated in accordance with all the requirements and restrictions applicable to mergers under the Act primarily concerned with railroad amalgamations, the Interstate Commerce Act. So far as here relevant, that means that the merger must be worked out and put before the Commission by the merging carriers.*fn12 It also means that one carrier

[ 347 U.S. Page 310]

     cannot be railroaded by the Commission into an undesired merger with another carrier.

In short, the consistency clause of § 77 incorporates by reference § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended. And the very heart of § 5 is that a merger of two carriers may be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission only if it originates as a voluntary proposal by the merging carriers. This essential prerequisite for a merger between Florida East Coast and Atlantic Coast Line -- two existing corporate entities -- must be complied with, for by virtue of the consistency clause the command of Congress applies even if one of these carriers is in § 77 proceedings just as much as it would if neither of the carriers were in receivership or trusteeship. The legislative incorporation of § 5 into § 77 should not result in its judicial mutilation.

The most recent occasion on which the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce comprehensively re-examined the subject of railroad reorganization was the report submitted in 1946 by Chairman Wheeler, the guiding spirit of most of the legislation here under consideration.*fn13 Much of what the Committee says there under the heading of "Avoidance of consolidation statute" is highly relevant here:

"In view of [the] many interests, immediately and directly affected by any proposed consolidation, Congress has provided a series of safeguards and procedural steps, in section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. . . .

"This statute and its statutory procedure, statutory safeguards, and statutory rights have been set to one side in the ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.