statutory provisions similar to ours. (Cases cited.)' Nelson v. State Highway Bd., 110 Vt. 44, 1 A.2d 689, 693, 118 A.L.R. 915, 920. See also Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. Colburn, supra.
I have examined the other theories of the plaintiffs, one of them being that since there was a specific repealer in the New Jersey Act of 1947, N.J.L.1947, c. 283, § 4, rescinding legislation for the construction of a bridge across the Delaware River at Yardley, Pennsylvania, N.J.L.1935, c. 270, which is evidence that the New Jersey Legislature did not intend to repeal any portion of its 1912 Act and amendments which provided that free bridges should be maintained and repaired without the collection of tolls and that repealer of these by implication should not be countenanced. This theory cannot be favored in the light of the construction given herein to the Supplemental Agreement of 1947.
The contention of plaintiffs that failure to specify in the title of the 1947 legislation of New Jersey, N.J.L.1947, c. 283, that power was granted to replace a free bridge with a toll bridge precludes the Commission from closing and demolishing the Bridge, as an act beyond any power granted to it by that legislation, cannot stand. Enough information was contained in the title of the Act to inform the ordinary reader of the purpose of the legislation, the general subject of which was fairly expressed. As was said in Bucino v. Malone, 1953, 12 N.J. 330, 344, 96 A.2d 669, 676:
'The title of a statute is a label, not an index. It is unnecessary and in fact undesirable for a title to give a resume of the provisions of the act. The constitutional provision (Art. IV, Section VII, par. 4 of the New Jersey Constitution) is complied with when the title gives notice to the Legislature and the public of the general purpose of the act.'
Moreover, the title and the body of the Act were clearly informative that its grants of powers were to be in combination with the action of the State of Pennsylvania and that the agreement consummated thereby would be the governing authority of the Commission created by the combined acts of the States. The alleged omission to particularize in detail in the title of the New Jersey legislation of 1947 all features of the powers vested in the Commission cannot be held to invalidate the law or now strike down the Supplemental Agreement of 1947.
Another support for the theory of the perpetuity of free bridges advanced by the plaintiffs was that in legislation subsequent to 1947, N.J.L.1951, c. 284 and N.J.L.1952, c. 333, the New Jersey Legislature disclosed a clear indication that it had no intention in the 1947 Act of empowering the Commission to close and demolish a free bridge because while the powers of the Commission were again enlarged by these subsequent acts, no specific mention is made of power to replace a free bridge with a toll bridge. This is an extension of plaintiffs' argument that repealer by implication of what they consider implicit authority for perpetual free bridges beginning with the 1912 legislation, must not be favored. As held herein, it cannot be granted the merit claimed for it.
Similar support claimed by plaintiffs in the enactment of 1952 by the Legislature of New Jersey, N.J.L.1952, c. 219, N.J.S.A. 32:9A-1, must likewise fall. In this statute the disposition of property 'other than bridges and approaches' was authorized. It merely referred to property acquired by New Jersey in connection with the acquisition of the joint state owned bridges determined to be no longer needed or useful in administering the bridges and that the proceeds should be paid into the General State Fund of New Jersey. The exclusory language hardly reflects the light claimed for it by the plaintiffs, namely that it shows that the Commission was never empowered to close or demolish a free bridge and substitute therefor a toll bridge.
Nor does the Concurrent Resolution of the New Jersey Legislature filed on December 30, 1953 (N.J.L.1953 Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 2) carry with it persuasion that its predecessor body of 1947 did not intend that the Commission should be empowered to close and demolish the Bridge. This was passed after the complaint in this suit was filed. It noted the possibility of the failure of jurisdiction in this suit and requested the Attorney General of New Jersey to institute a suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey for the same injunctive relief that this suit seeks. It does no more than indicate that it was the consensus of the legislators that the question raised here should be litigated in the New Jersey Court in the event that this suit became terminated by failure of jurisdiction of this court over it.
The authorization to close and demolish this Bridge has come about through logical evolution in the planning by the Legislatures of the States to meet the requirements of adequacy and safety in modern transport facilities. The contention of the plaintiffs that a 'replaced' bridge must be free of tolls cannot be sustained where, as here, the tolls do not go into the pockets of private bridge owners but into the construction, maintenance and operation of transport facilities determined to be adequate and safe. Indeed this is in no wise inconsistent with any expression in any of the New Jersey Legislative enactments presented by the plaintiffs. This Bridge, after its acquisition by the States, is to remain free as long as it exists. It has been replaced at a location determined to serve substantially the same traffic. Of course, it has not been replaced by the same kind of bridge and has a greatly improved equivalent. The 64-year-old structure converted to vehicular traffic from a railroad bridge has been replaced by a modern span designed to meet traffic undreamed of and unimagined at the date of its construction. Incidental to its replacement, tolls with be charged the users of the new construction by a public body in the interest of the public in its largest sense pursuant to the legislative plans of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. To adopt the plaintiffs' constructions and contentions would defeat the intent of the Agreement of the States and, coming after the consummation of commitments of the Commission to those whose money has been provided and used for the construction of and payment for the facilities under discussion, would unjustifiably impair the obligation of the Commission's covenant to close and demolish the Bridge.
Therefore the complaint of the plaintiffs must be dismissed and judgment entered in favor of the defendant.
The requirement of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., shall be considered satisfied by the recital of the findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in this opinion.
An order for judgment in conformity herewith should be settled on April 5, 1954.