1 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 836. In the Dos Reis case, lengthy service in combat against the United States, indicated in DiIorio as the most conclusive evidence of disloyalty to the United States, was in nowise involved. What was involved was the conscription in the Portugese Army of one who outspokenly claimed American citizenship. Here the court dealt, not with one fighting against the United States, but with one in an army which was allied with that of this country. Here the court dealt with one who vehemently protested against his being drafted, not because he was opposed to serving Portugal, as all young Portugese were required to serve, but expressly because he claimed American citizenship. And, 'As soon as he (Camara) could manage it he returned to this country, as a stowaway, which attests the intensity of his purpose to retain his American nationality.' Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, supra, 161 F.2d at page 862. To the contrary, Perri never protested his American citizenship on being drafted into the Italian Army.
Let us consider first Perri's entry into the Army, second, his service therein, each of which may constitute a cause of expatriation.
As to the entry into the Army in the Dos Reis case, Camara's drafting clearly overcame his will to retain American citizenship. Thus, such entry was under duress, and could not constitute a ground for expatriation. But when Perri was drafted, he made no such claim formal or informal. His will to remain an American was not overborne. Insofar as his interest in American citizenship was concerned, there was no duress. The only compulsion that existed as to him was the Italian law, under which he, known as an Italian, with all other young Italians, were inducted into the Army. 'But that does not amount to an involuntary or forced act in the sense that he was compelled to perform such acts in spite of an 'intensity of * * * purpose to retain his American nationality.' Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, supra. Any claimed reluctance in the performance of these acts was no more than may have conditioned the minds of many other Italians at the time.' Cantoni v. Acheson, D.C.N.D. Cal. S.D. 1950, 88 F.Supp. 576, 578.
Indeed, in view of the practically world-wide policy of foreign states to conscript in the recruitment of their armies, a policy well known to the Congress of the United States before it enacted the expatriation provision in question, Congress could hardly have intended that conscription per se should render its Nationality Code inapplicable to the situation. For if such were the case, this provision of the Nationality Code would be almost a waste of words. Can Congress have intended to say 'that the hundreds of thousands of United States servicemen who were conscripted and served during the last war were involuntarily forced into the service under duress? On the contrary, when they answered the call to arms without resistance their action was voluntary and this included those who did not view the prospect of army life with relish as well as those imbued with the zeal of patriotism.' Hamamoto v. Acheson, D.C.S.D. Cal. 1951, 98 F.Supp. 904, 905. Rather it would seem that Congress must have recognized army conscription to be the order of the day, and that accordingly conscription per se was covered by the Nationality Code.
However, even if it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the world-wide policy of conscription was not within the mind of Congress in enacting these provisions of the Nationality Code, Congress distinguished in such provisions between 'entering' the armed forces of a foreign state and 'serving' in such armed forces. We therefore turn to the consideration of Perri's service in the Italian forces for some nine years, during at least five of which he was in active combat against the United States and its allies, his services against this country having been so efficient that he was promoted. Obviously, these services were as a loyal subject of Italy, not as a loyal subject of the United States. Obviously they, plus his lengthy return to Italy to marry, with United States troops in Italy for his protection from compulsion, had he desired it, all indicate that his service in the Italian Army, far from being under duress, was completely voluntary, as a loyal son of Italy. Perri's situation is thus essentially on all fours with that of the Italian held an expatriate in the above DiIoro case, and by the same court which decided the Dos Reis case. For DiIorio, while 'inducted' into the Italian Army, thereafter 'served voluntarily' therein, and was therefore held to have lost his American citizenship. Indeed, in the DiIorio case, the Court obviously considered such service in an army combatting the armed forces of this country, as being the most conclusive evidence of an intent not to be loyal to this country, if same were not, indeed, treason, for one still a citizen of this country. Thus, quite regardless of whether Perri's induction into the Italian Army expatriated him, his long-continued service in such army, in combat against this country, clearly did have that effect, under the very words of the statute.
But lest there be any question, as to Perri's acting during all this time as an Italian, rather than as an American, we turn to his 'voting in a political election in a foreign state', itself a cause of expatriation under the code.
Perri claims that he voted because he feared the loss of his ration card- the stock answer. But it will be noted that he voted in both the municipal and national elections in 1946, and not in the national election of 1948. Such was the situation in Italy in both 1946 and 1948, that the Congress tendered a ready means to one who voted in the national elections of either 1946 and 1948, to overcome the effect of any expatriation resulting therefrom. 8 U.S.C.A. § 723 note, Pub. Law 114, Chapter 321- 82 Cong., 1st. Sess. This of itself indicates there was similar pressure as to voting at both these national elections. But the real question is, whether this pressure sufficed to overcome the will of that individual to remain loyal to the United States, to the extent that such voting was under duress in that regard.
Here we have the same individual operating under the same duress at both times, yet feeling free at one of these times not to vote. Since the same pressure failed to make him vote in 1948, it cannot be said to have compelled him to vote in 1946. This is entirely without regard to the fact that he voted also in the 1946 municipal elections, at which time any existing pressure was doubtless less than at the national elections. In short, by his voting plaintiff also expatriated himself from the United States under the statute.
Since the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the court appear in the above opinion, they will not be duplicated.
An order for judgment for defendant may be entered accordingly.