Emergency Housing Act of 1946, as provided in this schedule and in other orders, regulations, directions, schedules and directives of the Civilian Production Administration.'
This apparently resulted in a consolidation or an amalgamation of P.R. 33 with the powers under Housing Expediter Priorities Regulation 5, and other orders, regulations and directions of the Civilian Production Administration and of the Housing Expediter, so far as future action might be concerned. It contains no express reversals or revocations of prior grants. The Civilian Production Administration issued Directive 42, as amended (August 27, 1946) which authorized the Housing Expediter and the National Housing Agency: '* * * to perform the functions and exercise the power, authority and discretion conferred upon the President by the Second War Powers Act of 1942 and to perform the functions and exercise the power, authority and discretion conferred upon the Housing Expediter by the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946 with respect to the functions described below, and in so doing may impose such conditions and requirements and such terms as he may deem necessary and appropriate in the public interest and to effectuate the purposes of the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946.'
It appears under paragraph (b), defining the scope of this directive, that it gives to the Housing Expediter all powers vested in the Civilian Production Administration appearing in Veterans Housing Program Order No. 1, dated March 26, 1946, which initially creates the Veterans' Emergency Housing Program as recommended by the report of the Housing Expediter to the President, dated February 7, 1946. This was before P.L. 388 and before the Veterans' Emergency Housing Program was initiated by Congress on May 22, 1946. It will be remembered that P.L. 388 was in large part repealed by P.L. 129 (1947) leaving, basically, only Sec. 10 thereof, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1738, 1739, 1743, continuing in force and effect. The latter section has no bearing here, and we again return to P.L. 129 upon which to rest our now weary head. We must arouse ourselves, however, finally to answer the question as to whether or not the project in question was assisted by P.L. 388 during its lifetime. Apparently the Congress did not have a very high regard for it or it would not have so crippled it. Therefore, in considering it here as a factor bearing on the intent of Congress to continue its spirit in P.L. 129, it is of value only in emphasizing the fact that Congress intended to disregard it.
It is argued that it is quite unthinkable that the Congress, with its strong urge to aid the veterans of World War II, intended to leave the 4 veterans housed in this 33 unit project without any control over their landlord to hold their rents down. It would not be at all difficult here, functioning under a like urge, to enter the sphere of dialectics, ideologies and philosophies. This I cannot do for reasons hereinbefore stated.
Earlier herein consideration was given to the meaning of the word 'priorities' as used in these statutes. It is noted that generally, if not in every instance, it is coupled with the word 'allocations.' The latter is defined by Funk and Wagnalls as a 'setting apart.' Thus it may be reasoned that the holder of a priority is given a right subsequently to have something set apart for his specific use. The holder of a priority, which is in its nature a license, is subject to revocation. When, however, the priority is matured by a physical allocation, as in the instant case, it becomes as fixed and irrevocable as is curtesy consummate in a husband in his deceased wife's estate. So here I find that the priorities, by subsequent allocations, in the absence of revocation, ripened into a vested right. It cannot be reasoned that because the government agents did nothing they did something which aided defendant under a specific act (P.L. 388). That act calls for action, not inaction, nor have I been able to find any statutory or other language which can be read as an express or an implied revocation.
The motion for a preliminary injunction is denied and the temporary restraint is lifted.
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