and relationships and the prayers for relief that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied as a complete bar to this entire action.
Though the doctrine does not operate as a complete bar to the present litigation, some of the issues there determined may well bar a reconsideration of those same issues here. In the case of Sutton v. Wentworth, 1 Cir., 247 F. 493, 501, the court stated:
'There is a difference, sometimes overlooked, between the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action for the same cause and its effect as an estoppel in another suit between the same parties upon a different cause of action. In the former case a judgment on the merits must be pleaded, and is an absolute bar to a subsequent action; it concludes the parties, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the suit, but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose. In the latter case, the judgment in the prior action may be offered in evidence, and operates as an estoppel only as to those matters which were there directly in issue and either admitted by the pleadings or actually tried.'
This principle was recently approved by the Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 598, 68 S. Ct. 715, 719, where the rule was stated as follows:
'But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different cause or demand, the principle of res judicata is applied much more narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined, but 'only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered."
Where the former decision has been dispositive of any issue in this case it will be pointed out as the various issues raised herein are taken up.
The result of the 1926 case was to grant General Electric a legal monopoly in the manufacture and sale of the incandescent lamps. General Electric operated under a system of licenses permitting use of its patents, 527 in number at the commencement of this action, under specified conditions. The license system involved two types, 'A' and 'B' with considerable differences in their requirements.
At the time the instant suit was filed, the following licenses were in existence:
Westinghouse dated August 1, 1927
"B" Licenses (Exs. 27-G,
Sylvania dated August 1, 1933
Consolidated dated July 1, 1933
Kenrad dated July 1, 1933
Tungsol dated October 1, 1933
Chicago dated January 1, 1934
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