may have infringed. The court was unable to decide from the evidence if the Southern District of New York were the principal place of business of the association and the trial court was directed to try this issue if the plaintiff wished to proceed against the association. A concurring opinion recognized that the association might have several principal places of doing business, and concluded that the association was an inhabitant of, and could be sued in, the Southern District of New York, if that were one of its principal places of doing business.
The pertinent part of the above decision is the court's recognition that an unincorporated association may be sued in a district other than where it maintains its principal office. Therein, the pleadings disclosed that the principal office was located in Washington, D.C. Here, the 'International' contends that it can be sued only in the District of Ohio where it maintains its principal office at Akron. The statute involved here requires that the association must be sued in the district whereof it is an inhabitant. In the case discussed the statute contained terms which the court held were in contrast; namely, 'inhabitant,' as opposed to 'regular and established place of business,' and for that reason the court felt that 'inhabitant' should mean a more permanent attachment.
The pleadings in this case allege that the 'International' includes all the local unions throughout the nation and state, that the defendant Herbert Bennett, the 'International' representative and agent, resides in New Jersey and supervises for 'International' all relations of the defendant 'Local' with the plaintiff and also the activities of other Locals in the Trenton area. It is alleged that the defendant Bosley resides in New Jersey and is the District Representative and agent of 'International' and that he supervises for 'International' the activities of other Locals in the State of New Jersey and the relationship between plaintiff and 'International'.
These allegations that the 'International' is present in this district through its component parts, its own representatives, and that its business through them is conducted in this district, must be viewed as undenied on a consideration of its motion. Berger v. Clouser, D.C., 36 F.Supp. 168, 170; United States v. Brownley, D.C., 34 F.Supp. 923, 924. That the 'International' is an inhabitant of the district has been adequately pleaded and venue has been properly laid.
The government contends that the constitutional objections are not ripe for determination at this time, and should be deferred until after comprehensive consideration so that the validity of the Act can be weighed against the background of the social, economic and military factors which inspired its enactment. The mechanics of trial upon issue other than constitutionality are so simple and the probabilities and possibilities of terminal results are such as to render it quite unnecessary to approach the constitutional problems raised. Hence, we deem the application of the government entirely reasonable and its motion will be granted. Borden's Farm Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 55 S. Ct. 187, 79 L. Ed. 281; Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 59 S. Ct. 15, 83 L. Ed. 6.
Defendants contend they are not in fault because plaintiff provoked the stoppage of work when the rates were crhanged, and that plaintiff failed to comply with Sec. 1508(a) (2) of the Act providing
'For not less than thirty days after any notice under paragraph (1) is given, the contractor and his employees shall continue production under all the conditions which prevailed when such dispute arose.'
Defendants say plaintiff was required to continue production under all the conditions which prevailed before the rates were changed. This, however, overlooks the provision of the statute that requires continuous production under previous conditions after notice is given and that in this case it is alleged that no notice was given.
Defendants also say under this argument that plaintiff had knowledge of the dispute since it provoked the stoppage, and that it in effect is attempting to penalize those who had no knowledge. Other objections dealing with lack of knowledge on the part of non-employee defendants, and the absence of a duty to give notice were made. We think the complaint is sufficient in this respect for it alleges the non-employee defendants are representatives and that they wilfully, failed to comply with the Act. Whether or not they were representatives and wilfully failed to comply with the Act are issues which must be settled by trial and not on motion to strike or dismiss.
It is moved as to 'all or some of the defendants' to strike out so much of paragraph 16 of the complaint as reads: '(and under said act each defendant herein was under a duty to refrain from urging, inducing, causing or permitting a cessation of production in the plant of the plaintiff because of a labor dispute until notice had been given and thirty days had elapsed as aforesaid)' for the reason that the portion of the statute under which the action is brought does not impose any such duty on any one or more of the defendants. Sec. 1508(a)(2), supra, requires the contractor and employees to continue production for not less than thirty days after notice is given. The quoted language appears in parenthesis in paragraph 16 of plaintiff's complaint and we cannot find that the Act itself imposes the duty alleged in that passage, and, therefore, it will be stricken.
In view of our determination that the Act in question was in effect at the time this cause of action accrued, we believe that defendants' objection that no cause of action was stated has been overcome. Plaintiff alleges it is a war contractor within the meaning of the Act producing materials under war contracts, a cessation of production, a wilful failure to give the required notice and damages. These allegations are sufficient.
An order should be taken striking out that part of paragraph 16 of the complaint in parenthesis, but denying the motions to dismiss pursuant to the discussion in this opinion.
The alternative motion for a more particular statement of damages to enable defendants to prepare for trial was not argued and will be deferred until a showing is made that particularity is required.