services, as may from time to time be needed. * * * .
'(b) The principal office of the Administrator shall be in the District of Columbia, but he or any duly authorized representative may exercise any or all of his powers in any place. * * * .
'(d) The Administrator may, from time to time, issue such regulations and orders as he may deem necessary or proper in order to carry out the purposes and provisions of this Act.'
It is our opinion that this argument is untenable. Section 202 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 922, and particularly subdivisions (a) and (b) thereof,
specifically vests in the Administrator the authority to conduct such investigations and hearings as may be necessary in the discharge of his duties, and, as an incident thereto, the necessary authority to issue subpoenas. This authority is expressly vested in the Administrator and may not be delegated to any other person. There is nothing in either Section 202 or 201, upon which the petitioner primarily relies, to sustain the Administrator's attempted delegation of authority by administrative order.
The Supreme Court, passing on comparable provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, supra, 315 U.S.at page 361, 62 S. Ct.at page 654, stated: 'A construction of the Act which would thus permit the Administrator to delegate all his duties, including those involving administrative judgment and discretion which the Act has in terms given only to him, can hardly be accepted unless plainly required by its words.'
It is further argued that even if express authority to delegate the subpoena power were lacking, 'the authority would exist by necessary implication.' This argument was advanced in the case of Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, and was apparently supported by the grounds urged here. The complete answer to the argument is found in the opinion of the Court, 315 U.S.at page 363, 62 S. Ct.at page 655: 'Unlimited authority of an administrative officer to delegate the exercise of the subpoena power is not lightly to be inferred. It is a power capable of oppressive use, especially when it may be indiscriminately delegated and the subpoena is not returnable before a judicial officer. Under the present Act, the subpoena may, as in this case, be used to compel production at a distant place of practically all of the books and records of a manufacturing business, covering considerable periods of time. True, there can be no penalty incurred for contempt before there is a judicial order of enforcement. But the subpoena is in form an official command, and even though improvidently issued it has some coercive tendency, either because of ignorance of their rights on the part of those whom it purports to command or their natural respect for what appears to be an official command, or because of their reluctance to test the subpoena's validity by litigation. All these are cogent reasons for inferring an intention of Congress not to give unrestricted authority to delegate the subpoena power which it has in terms granted only to the responsible head of the agency.'
The application of the petitioner is denied.