and therefore, any activities growing out of such strike cannot be restrained by this Court without a strict compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'
This court, therefore, in the light of the foregoing opinions, is constrained to hold that a jurisdictional strike or controversy wherein one union is engaging in an argument with another union over which union shall represent the employees of a particular concern is a labor dispute regardless of when such dispute starts, within the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the court is powerless to enjoin the acts complained of in the bill.
I come to this conclusion of law with a firm conviction that all morals and equity are on the side of the employer who, without cause of his own, finds himself enmeshed in such a controversy and faces the loss of his business and is powerless to prevent it.
I am mindful to warn the defendant in this case and through the defendant, others interested in the cause of labor not to be jubilant or rejoice too much in gaining the decision in the present controversy. I speak not as a so-called reactionary but as one who has labored as physically as any of the defendants. I have in my time worked in industrial plants before the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the Wagner-Connery Act, without the benefit of a union or a bargaining agent, for 9 3/4 hours straight time per day and a 54 hour week, and, therefore, know the need of labor unions, but I say that it is time for the unions themselves to consider some things other than just who will represent a certain group, and thus start these jurisdictional strikes and cause serious unemployment of the very laboring classes that they are primarily supposed to represent and help.
I fear that by such continued activities they will bring down upon themselves reactionary legislation which is always bad legislation, for we are a liberal government and a liberal people.
I must be mindful at the very least of the argument of the government before the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson, supra, which speaks on this problem, and for the defendant's consideration, I quote it:
'There is no form of labor warfare so opposed to the public interest and to the interest of organized labor itself as the jurisdictional strike which stops the commerce of an employer who is trying to be fair to organized labor. An employer who finds himself the victim of such a strike is powerless. There is no concession he can make which will stop the attack on his business. Similarly, the union whose relations with the employer the other union뇧 to disrupt cannot rely on its satisfactory service or its superior craftsmanship to maintain its position; it has no weapon, other than ruthless economic warfare, to defend itself against the aggressive tactics of those would would destroy it.'
Does not this statement fit the equities of the present case?
And also the court's statement in the Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, supra:
'It may be urged that the situation presented strongly emphasizes the extreme one-sidedness of the National Labor Relations Act legislation; that is, the employer is bound to comply with the orders of the Board, but the employees are free to flout the Board's decision and create the anomalous and often calamitous situation of an employer's being caught, without fault on his part, between the upper and nether millstones. We are not unmindful of the apparent harsh consequences of our ruling, but such a result must not be permitted to affect our judgment in applying the law in the field of interpretation. We do not have the power to legislate. In labor disputes, we have only such equity jurisdiction as Congress has seen fit to grant.'
With these observations and in accordance with the opinions herein reviewed, the bill will be dismissed. Prepare an order.
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