1. I find as a matter of fact that the petitioner is a resident of this district and the court has jurisdiction.
2. The respondent is a corporation doing business in this district.
3. That prior to November 2, 1942, the petitioner was in the employ of respondent as treasurer and a director, office manager and purchasing agent, and that as office manager and purchasing agent, he received a salary of $ 80 a week.
4. That he left the employ to enter the armed forces of the United States, and he entered such service on November 2, 1942, and that he was placed on the inactive list on December 2, 1943, and given a certificate of service.
5. That he subsequently made application for re-employment on December 16, 1943, and that application was denied, and he was not given his job back, that that application is a continuing one.
6. That he ultimately received his honorable discharge on December 27, 1944, the application being a continuing one, it was denied, and he was not given his job back subsequent to December 27, 1944, and he has not been given his job as yet.
I, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the petitioner is entitled to be re-employed by the respondent, Van Doren Laundry Service, Inc., as office manager and purchasing agent at a salary of $ 80 a week.
The petitioner brings suit as an incident to the petition -- he brings a claim for the loss of wages from the 15th day of December, 1943 to the date of his actual restoration. In reference to that, it is within the discretion of the court to find from the facts whether such judgment should be given. By reason of the reorganization proceeding the company was in, I can see why they would be reluctant to hire the petitioner. Nevertheless, the court has passed upon that question now and I say they must take the petitioner back. However, I do not think from all the facts and circumstances, a money judgment should run incident to this petition, and I will, therefore, dismiss that portion of the petition seeking a money judgment for the time he has not worked, but I direct the company to retain him, the petitioner, in their employ for a period of one year from the date he is restored.
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