from an overall wage policy applicable to all employees or to employees of a specified group of which the veteran is a part.
Where the wage increase of a particular position results neither from an overall company wage policy, nor from automatic in-grade increases, the veteran is not automatically entitled to an increased wage for the sole reason that another who presently holds the same or a like position as that formerly held by the veteran is presently receiving a higher wage. In such case it can in no way be said that the veteran has been denied any seniority rights.
This is the more true where the position in question is of a professional or special nature requiring individual skill, ability and training such as is the position here involved. In such a case the wage is determined by individual ability rather than on a wage scale on the job itself.
It is worthy of note that following the plaintiff's entry into the Army, his immediate successor received a smaller compensation than that therefore received by the plaintiff. Some time thereafter the compensation of the present medical director was increased beyond the amount received by the plaintiff.
It is evident that no fixed or determined salary is paid by defendant to its medical directors. Whatever defendant's reasons for increasing the present medical director's salary may in fact have been, and several conflicting asserted reasons were given, is unimportant once it is determined that the wage increase was not the result of a wage policy on the part of defendant to increase wages generally for all employees, nor the result of an in-grade increase inherent in the position.
I am satisfied that the increased wage paid to the present medical director is directed solely to the individual and not to the position. In the performance of the duties of a medical director, extensive personal skill and ability are necessary. The abilities of any two men will vary to a degree and their relative value to the defendant company will be commensurate therewith.
There has been nothing before me to indicate that the plaintiff, had he remained in the employ of the defendant, would have received an increase similar to that now paid to the present medical director. The fact that plaintiff's immediate successor received a smaller compensation strongly indicates that the defendant had no established wage for the position, and that compensation was paid according to the value placed upon the individual.
It is my conclusion in the present instance that the defendant company fully met its obligation to the petitioner when it offered to reinstate him in his former position at the same salary he received at the time he was inducted into the Armed Services.
There remains for disposal the question of the good faith of defendant's proffered offer to reinstate the plaintiff.
As heretofore stated, defendant on March 20, 1945, offered to reinstate the plaintiff in his former position. Plaintiff declined to accept said offer for the alleged reason that the offer was insincere, inadequate and not in compliance with the law. Specifically, by way of affidavit, plaintiff asserts that the defendant offered to reinstate him to a position that would be subordinate to the present medical director, who is to be retained along with this plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges further that he was informed that he would in every instance be obliged to report to the present medical director and secure approval before he might undertake any treatment of defendant's employees.
These allegations by plaintiff are denied by the defendant, who by way of affidavits, asserts that although the present medical director is to be retained, such retention would in no way affect plaintiff's position or authority and that the offer to the plaintiff on March 20, 1945, was to restore him to a position of like seniority, status and pay, having the same authority and functions as the position previously held by him.
It is my conclusion that the offer made by the defendant to the plaintiff on March 20, 1945, to restore him to his former position was a bona fide offer, made in good faith and in full compliance with this Court's direction, and with the terms of the Selective Training and Service Act.
In view of this finding, the one year period of reemployment as ordered by this Court shall be construed to have begun on March 20, 1945.
These findings are made largely on submission by counsel for both parties of affidavits as to the factual situation.
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