proof of actual fraud. Of course, the value of the land and its character have been greatly enhanced by the planting of cultivated blueberries to which reference has been made.
The cases submitted by the claimants stand for the proposition that purchasers of property are chargeable with notice of public records and take subject to defects of title arising from deeds and instruments so recorded.The petitioners do not dispute this proposition but claim that notwithstanding defective title they cured the defect by adverse possession. It is interesting to note that the law expounded in Foulke v. Bond, supra, is the law of the great majority of jurisdictions.
The claimants imply that Sections 53 and 54 of the New Jersey Conveyance Act, 46:21-1, 46:22-1, of the Revised Statutes of New Jersey, 1937, N.J.S.A. dealing with recorded deeds as notice to subsequent purchasers and the failure to record deeds as rendering them void as to all subsequent bona fide purchasers affect the decision of Foulke v. Bond, supra. The interpretation of these sections in Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 199, 96 A. 94, Ann.Cas.1917E, 484, dispels this implication. The court in that case said: "There was no express statutory provision making the record notice until 1883, and, if that act did in fact broaden the scope of the notice (as to which we express no opinion), it was repealed in 1898. In that year the Legislature, in enacting section 53, limited the notice to the same class of persons to whom it had been limited by construction prior to 1883". Page 203 of 88 N.J.L., page 95 of 96 A., Ann.Cas.1917E, 484. Therefore, the law as to notice to be applied to purchasers of property which existed at the time Foulke v. Bond, supra, was decided, was put into the form of a statute and was the same law that was in effect in 1903, the year of the conveyance from Robert Jones Davis to Melanie Crammer.
The petitioners' rights are further aided by statutes in force in the State of New Jersey with reference to actual uninterruptedly continued possession of real estate. These statutes read as follows:
"Thirty years' possession of real estate, except woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and sixty years' possession of woodlands or uncultivated tracts however commenced or continued.
"Thirty years' actual possession of any real estate excepting woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and sixty years' actual possession of woodlands or uncultivated tracts, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise, shall, in whatever way or manner such possession might have commenced or have been continued, vest a full and complete right and title in every actual possessor or occupier of such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and shall be a good and sufficient bar to all claims that may be made or actions commenced by any person whatsoever for the recovery of any such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts." Rev.Stat.N.J. (1937) § 2:25-1, N.J.S.A.
"Thirty years' actual possession of any real estate under claim or color of title.
"Thirty years' actual possession of any real estate, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise, wherever such possession commenced or is founded upon a proprietary right duly laid thereon, and recorded in the office of the surveyor general of the division in which the location was made, or in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to law, or wherever such possession was obtained by a fair bona fide purchase of such real estate from any person in possession thereof and supposed to have a legal right and title thereto, or from the agent of such person, shall be a good and sufficient bar to all prior locations, rights, titles, conveyances, or claims whatever, not followed by actual possession as aforesaid, and shall vest an absolute right and title in the actual possessor and occupier of all such real estate." Rev.Stat.N.J. (1937) § 2:25-2, N.J.S.A.
These sections were interpreted in Content v. Dalton, 121 N.J.Eq. 391, 190 A. 328, affirmed 122 N.J.Eq. 425, 194 A. 286, 112 A.L.R. 1031, to mean that the possession must be adverse in character. Possession of the property in question in the instant case was held adversely by petitioners and their predecessors for a period of approximately thirty-six years.
The petitioners are the owners of the property and entitled to the money deposited by the United States.