For the prosecutor, Meehan Brothers (Thomas F. Meehan, of counsel).
For the respondent, David T. Wilentz, attorney-general (John F. Bruther, assistant attorney-general, of counsel).
Before Brogan, Chief Justice, and Justices Parker and Perskie.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PERSKIE, J. The writ of certiorari in this case brings up before us a resolution of the State Board of Registration and Examination in Dentistry revoking prosecutor's license to practice dentistry in the State of New Jersey.
Respondent, hereafter referred to as the Board, on January 4, 1939, formally charged prosecutor with having advertised, on January 19, 1938, in the Jersey Journal, "the prices and charges to be made for dental work * * * as well as the character and durability of said work," in violation of the statute in such case made and provided. R.S. 45:6-7. Notice of a hearing was given specifying the charges made. Cf. Levine v. State Board, &c., Dentistry, 118 N.J.L.
384; 192 A. 840. Prosecutor entered a plea of guilty and was adjudged guilty. The resolution revoking prosecutor's license to practice dentistry in this state and presently before us for review, contains an adequate statement of facts upon which the revocation was based. Cf. Levine v. State Board, &c., Dentistry, 14 N.J. Mis. R. 738; 186 A. 814. The resolution was formally adopted on March 24th, 1939. Prosecutor then applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari to review it. The allocatur expressly stayed the revocation pending "final decision [by] this court * * * on the writ." R.S. 45:6-9.
This court has already sustained the constitutionality of the statute for the violation of which prosecutor's license was revoked. Cf. Levine v. State Board, &c., Dentistry, 121 N.J.L. 193; 1 A.2d 876. Accordingly no argument is made on that score.
The single point raised and argued is that the penalty is harsh and unreasonable.
We are asked to reverse the action of the Board and pronounce such judgment on the evidence as shall be warranted. That request is based upon R.S. 45:6-9, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows:
"The [Supreme] court may reverse or affirm in whole or in part the findings or determination of the board, or pronounce such judgment on the evidence ...