The opinion of the court was delivered by: FORMAN
Nine of the above-listed causes have to do with railroad taxes imposed for the year 1934 and eight of them for the year 1935.
In each year temporary restraining orders were issued by this court at the prayer of the plaintiffs which have had the effect of staying the collection of the taxes.
Now the defendants move to vacate the restraints imposed and the plaintiffs press for preliminary injunctions in each case pending final adjudication.
Counsel for the plaintiffs include in their last brief submitted herein a reference to the case of the Reading Company v. Martin et al. (No. 5200), but that plaintiff is not affected by the issues discussed herein because it is represented that it has paid the taxes against it for the years 1934 and 1935 in full.
The plaintiffs known herein as the railroads carried appeals from the assessments against them to the New Jersey State Board of Tax Appeals which found against them.
Pursuant to section 14 of the Railroad Tax Act (P.L.1888, p. 278 [4 Comp.St. N.J.1910, p. 5271, § 458]) the Attorney General of New Jersey applied in 1935 and 1936 to a Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court for orders that the taxes, interest, and costs should be made a record of the Supreme Court and judgments should be entered thereon in the name of the State of New Jersey. Such orders were actually entered in 1935 and 1936, but no further action was taken thereunder after the issuance of the restraining orders herein dated July 9, 1935 and June 9, 1936, respectively.
In brief the defendants contend that the said restraining orders should be vacated because:
1. There are no facts before the court to support such interlocutory relief; that no irreparable injury is threatened to the railroads and that the bills of complaint in each case are not sufficiently verified;
2. This court has no jurisdiction to entertain the bills of complaint because the application for injunctions have not been presented to a court constituted as required by section 268 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. § 380);
4. The complaints on which the restraining orders were based fail to show that the railroads were without adequate remedies under the laws of the state of New Jersey;
The railroads repeat all of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary injunctions urged by them in the 1932 and 1933 cases and the defendants repeat, in addition to the aforementioned reasons for the vacation of the restraining orders, the grounds they urged in opposing the 1932 and 1933 orders.
At this juncture in these proceedings the main difference in the status thereof and that of the 1932 cases is that here an additional step has been undertaken pursuant to Section 14 of the Railroad Tax Act, 4 Comp.St.N.J.1910, p. 5271, § 458 ...