On rule to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue.
For the prosecutor, John J. Meehan.
For the respondent, Robert Carey and Harry Lane.
Before Justices Parker, Case and Bodine.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CASE, J. James Herod, on September 14th, 1932, filed his petition with the workmen's compensation bureau seeking compensation for incapacity alleged to be due to chrome poisoning, an occupational disease. He was last exposed to the poisoning on August 11th, 1930. On the employer's motion, Charles E. Corbin, deputy commissioner, dismissed the petition for the reason that the same was not filed within one year from the last exposure. Judge Erwin, in the Hudson
County Common Pleas, on appeal, affirmed that judgment. This is the return of a rule to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not go to Herod to review the judgment in the pleas.
When the Workmen's Compensation act was passed in 1911 (Pamph. L. 1911, ch. 95; 2 Cum. Supp. Comp. Stat. 1911-1925, p. 3868, § **236-1, 16, 20, 25, 32, 34), provision was made only for compensation for personal injuries arising from an accident in the ordinary sense of that term. In 1924 the legislature (Pamph. L. 1924, ch. 124) supplemented the Workmen's Compensation act by adding certain sections designated 22 (a) to 22 (f), inclusive, whereby named occupational diseases, including chrome poisoning, were declared to be compensable. Section 22 (e) follows (2 Cum. Supp. Comp. Stat. 1911-1925, § **236-26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31):
"All claims for compensation for compensable occupational disease shall be forever barred unless a petition is filed in duplicate with the secretary of the workmen's compensation bureau, at the state house in Trenton, within one year after date on which the employe ceased to be exposed in the course of employment with the employer to such occupational disease as hereinabove defined, or in case an agreement of compensation for compensable occupational disease has been made between such employer and such claimant, then within one year after the failure of the employer to make payment pursuant to the terms of such agreement; or in case a part of the compensation has been paid by such employer, then within one year after the last payment of compensation."
Some mind should be paid to this section because the legislature chose to add that paragraph to the provisions regarding occupational disease, and thereby conspicuously indicated its intention to deal with the limitation of claims for occupational disease separately from the limitation of claims arising out of injuries. Section 23 (h) (2 Cum. Supp. Comp. Stat. p. 3886, § **236-32, subsection 23 (h) dealt with the latter class of cases and provided as follows:
"In case of personal injury or death all claims for compensation on account thereof shall be ...