no other persons is the true and lawful owner thereof."
The Matoil Service & Transport Company, Inc., filed a claim for the boats, signed by their attorney and verified by him "upon information and belief."
The government by its pleadings contested the allegations of ownership in all of these claims.
No testimony was adduced by either side as to ownership or lack of ownership with regard to the claimant, Matoil Service & Transport Company, Inc.
As to the claim of Rizzo, although allegedly in court, he did not even by his own oral testimony substantiate his claims of ownership but chose to remain silent.
The government on the other hand produced at least one witness who testified that this self-same Rizzo had, at the time of the seizure, represented himself to be but a watchman hired only a few hours previously.
When the government, as in this case, has definitely put into issue the purported ownership of the claimants, the proceedings can then follow but one logical channel. The claimants must prove their allegations of ownership. If the ownership is in the "good faith" alleged by these claimants in their written claims, no hardship is imposed upon them by this requirement.
Here no effort was made by the claimants in this direction other than the perfunctory filing of the written claims and upon this allegation of their respective rights they seek to take advantage of all the protection made available by the Constitution and reserved only for those persons who have bona fide status to claim it.
Upon the question of proof of ownership relevant comment was made by Judge Woolsey of the Southern District of New York in The Sebastopol (D.C.) 47 F.2d 336, 342, wherein he said: "In situations such as we have here, where proceedings in rem against vessels are involved, if their owners come into court as claimants thereto, they come in as actors in the proceeding, for they are in effect petitioners asking for a favor -- to have their ships returned to them. U.S. v. 422 Casks of Wine, 1 Pet. 547, 549, 550, 7 L. Ed. 257. On such a petition the burden is on them to show their ownership, their present right to possession of the vessel, The R. W. Skillinger, 1 Flip. 436, 21 Fed. Cas. 102, 103, No. 12,181, and, in the case of a forfeiture proceeding under section 26 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act [ 27 USCA § 40], their innocence of complicity in the acts for which the forfeiture is sought. Cf. U.S. v. One Hundred and Twenty-nine Packages, 27 Fed. Cas. 284, 285, 286, No. 15,941. At this point in any case in rem issue may be joined under a practice long familiar to determine the claimant's locus standi. U.S. v. 422 Casks of Wine, 1 Pet. 547, 549, 550, 7 L. Ed. 257; The Two Marys (D.C.) 10 F. 919, 920, 928; The Steamer Spark v. Lee Choi Chum, 1 Sawy. 718, 22 Fed. Cas. 871, 873, No. 13,206; The Prindiville, 1 Brown's Adm. 487, 19 Fed. Cas. 1345, 1346, No. 11,435; U.S. v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement, 27 Fed. Cas. 292, 293, No. 15,945."
Not only is such a showing necessary in a proceeding in rem but in criminal cases as well a motion to suppress evidence will not prevail unless the moving party be one whose constitutional rights are imperiled.
In the case of Connolly v. Medalie (C.C.A.) 58 F.2d 629, 630, the petitioner was, as here, a "watchman," and the court held as follows: "We assume for argument that the search and seizure were unlawful; and that any persons aggrieved might suppress the evidence so acquired. None of the petitioners fall within that class. Although Connolly alleged that he was in 'sole charge, possession and control' of the brewery, it was only as a 'watchman.' This relation to the property did not make its invasion a wrong to him; his supposed 'possession' was not such at all. He was only a servant on the premises, and, certainly in New York, had no possession; possession remained in his employer. Kerrains v. People, 60 N.Y. 221, 19 Am. Rep. 158; Presby v. Benjamin, 169 N.Y. 377, 62 N.E. 430, 57 L.R.A. 317; Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 90; Napier v. Spielmann, 127 App. Div. 567, 111 N.Y.S. 983. The entry and the search which followed, were therefore no wrong to him, but to the Neversink companies, which were the owners, if he be right. He would for this reason be unable to secure a return of the property seized."
Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit then cites an entire collection of cases upon the subject including Chepo v. United States (3d C.C.A.) 46 F.2d 70.
The claimants' theory seems to be that by filing the sworn notices of claim they have cast themselves in the roles of actors in the proceedings and that no further proof of ownership is necessary even though their claims are negatived by the government pleadings. They argue that a seizure illegally obtained must be returned. The cases they cite support such a contention but the query still remains -- Who has the right to raise the question of the legality or illegality of the search, and what quantum of proof is necessary to demonstrate his status?
In all of said cases cited by the claimants the owners either appear or the question of ownership is definitely not made an issue by the pleadings. Every case cited by claimants is distinguished in these respects from the case at bar.
I find at this preliminary stage of the proceedings that sufficient proof of ownership has not been adduced by the claimants to warrant the summary dismissal of the libel, and consideration of the actual legality of the search and seizure is made unnecessary now. The motions to dismiss the libels will be denied.
In view of the large expense attendant upon the storage of these seizures, pending the litigation, the cases may be set down for final hearing at as early a date as convenient to all parties concerned. Meanwhile, the United States attorney should make application to increase the indemnification for costs furnished by the claimants, in the event that the government should be finally sustained.
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