On appeal from the Supreme Court.
For the appellant, Philip Wendkos.
For the respondent, George D. Rothermel.
The grounds of appeal filed in this case fail to raise properly any point for the consideration of this court. The rule is thoroughly settled that grounds of appeal, whether in civil or criminal cases at law, should specifically point out the judicial action complained of, and in the case of rulings on evidence, should state the name of the witness, the questions or answers objected to and ruled upon by the trial judge; in the case of instructions to the jury, should quote the precise instruction complained of, and in the case of requests to charge proferred and refused, should embody the actual language of the request and not refer to it by number or other method of citation. State v. Blaine, 104 N.J.L. 325; State Highway Commission v. Zyk, 105 Id. 156; McKenna v. Reade, Ibid. 408, 412; Chapin v. Kreps, 106 Id. 424; Klein v. Shryer, 106 Id. 432; Stathos v. Bunevich, 107 Id. 269, 272.
The grounds of appeal in the case now before us are as follows:
(1) The judgment is contrary to both the law and evidence of the case.
(2) The defendant, by proving its counter-claim and offering proof of an accord and satisfaction between the plaintiff and defendant's decedent waived the privilege granted to the defendant by the fourth section of the Evidence act of New Jersey.
(3) By offering proof of the counter-claim and of accord and satisfaction it was equivalent to the representative party offering herself first as a witness in her own behalf.
(4) The proof offered by the defendant rendered the plaintiff competent to testify to any and all transactions and conversations between the plaintiff and defendant's decedent.
(5) The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff the right to testify as to her transactions and conversations with defendant's decedent.
(6) The defendant offered no testimony whatever to refute the allegations and proofs of the plaintiff.
(7) The defendant did not introduce evidence to rebut the presumption that defendant's decedent promised to pay plaintiff for the services which ...