On appeal from the Essex County Circuit Court.
For the appellant Irvington Iron Works, Kanter & Kanter (Elias A. Kanter, of counsel).
For the respondent, Peck & Rawson (Thomas J. Markey, of counsel).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TRENCHARD, J. This is the appeal of the Irvington Iron Works from a judgment entered upon a verdict for the plaintiff in the Circuit Court.
On March 9th, 1928, Joseph C. Hughes, plaintiff-respondent, acquired a note from the Irvington Iron Works, a New Jersey corporation, by the payment of $1,232.50 to that corporation. Thereafter the plaintiff sold the note to the Mutual Bank of Roseville. The note was made by the Rankin Realty Company and was payable at the Colonial Trust Company of Newark on May 2d, 1928. On the day of maturity of the note the Mutual Bank of Roseville was the owner of it. The evidence tends to shows that the note was presented for payment at the Colonial Trust Company, through the clearing house in Newark, and it was dishonored. Notice of dishonor was sent to the plaintiff. He was obliged to pay the amount of the note to the Mutual Bank of Roseville, the owner thereof at the time of its maturity. After notice of dishonor was served upon all prior endorsers and the maker of the note (as the evidence tends to show) and upon their refusal or neglect to pay, suit was instituted against them in the Circuit Court. Judgment by default was entered against all of the parties except the Irvington Iron Works. At the trial judgment was entered upon the verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the Irvington Iron Works, and the latter (hereinafter called the defendant) appealed from the judgment.
The questions on this appeal arise upon exceptions to the refusal to nonsuit, refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant, and refusals to charge.
The defendant contended at the trial, and contends here, that it was an accommodation endorser, and being a corporation was not liable, and this contention was made a basis for the motion to direct a verdict and for a request to charge.
To this it is a sufficient answer to say that the contention is not well grounded in fact.
The proofs at the trial conclusively showed that the
defendant sold the note to the plaintiff and received therefor the latter's check for $1,232.50 payable to the defendant's order, which it deposited to its credit in its bank and used the proceeds. It therefore received value for the note, and hence was not, under the terms of section 29 of ...