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SCHICK v. UNITED STATES. BROADWELL V. UNITED STATES

May 31, 1904

SCHICK
v.
UNITED STATES.

BROADWELL
v.
UNITED STATES



ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna, Holmes, Day

Author: Brewer

[ 195 U.S. Page 66]

 MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

The constitutionality of the oleomargarine legislation having

[ 195 U.S. Page 67]

     been settled in McCray v. United States, just decided, there is in these two cases only a single question. The plaintiffs in error were severally prosecuted by information in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, under section 11 of the act of August 2, 1886, 24 Stat. 209, which reads: "That every person who knowingly purchases or receives for sale any oleomargarine which has not been branded or stamped according to law shall be liable to a penalty of fifty dollars for each such offense."

In each case the parties in writing waived a jury and agreed to submit the issues to the court. Judgments were entered in favor of the United States and their collection ordered by only the civil process of execution. That the defendants had failed to comply with the section was proved. Indeed, it was not seriously disputed, the defence resting only on the alleged unconstitutionality of the act. The waiver of a jury was not assigned as error, nor referred to by counsel at the hearing before us, either in brief or argument. The question of its effect upon the judgment was suggested by this court, and briefs were called for from the respective parties. Such briefs have been filed, and both agree that the waiver of a jury did not invalidate the proceedings. Notwithstanding this, the fact of the waiver appears in the record.

We entertain no doubt that the parties could rightfully make such a waiver, and that the judgments are in no way invalidated thereby. It will be noticed that the section characterizes the act prohibited as an offense, and subjects the party to a penalty of fifty dollars. So small a penalty for violating a revenue statute indicates only a petty offense. It is not one necessarily involving any moral delinquency. The violation may have been the result of ignorance or thoughtlessness, and must be classed with such illegal acts as acting as an auctioneer or peddler without a license, or making a deed without affixing the proper stamp. That by other sections of this statute more serious offenses are described and more grave punishments provided does not lift this one to the

[ 195 U.S. Page 68]

     dignity of a crime. Not infrequently a single statute in its several sections provides for offenses of different grades, subject to different punishments, and to prosecution in different ways. In some States in the same act are gathered all the various offenses against the person, ranging from simple assault to murder, and imposing punishments from a mere fine to death. This very statute furnishes an illustration. By one clause the knowingly selling of adulterated butter in any other than the prescribed form subjects the party convicted thereof to a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment for not more than two years. An officer of customs violating certain provisions of the act is declared guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, and imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than three years. Obviously these violations of certain provisions of the statute must be classed among serious criminal offenses, and can be prosecuted only by indictment, while the violations of the statute in the cases before us were prosecuted by information. The truth is, the nature of the offense and the amount of punishment prescribed rather than its place in the statutes determine whether it is to be classed among serious or petty offenses, whether among crimes or misdemeanors. Clearly both indicate that this particular violation of the statute is only a petty offense.

In such a case there is no constitutional requirement of a jury. In the third clause of section 2, Article III, of the Constitution it is provided that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;" and in Article VI of the amendments, that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." If there be any conflict between these two provisions the one found in the amendments must control, under the well-understood rule that the last expression of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier

[ 195 U.S. Page 69]

     one. But that in the body of the Constitution does not include a petty offense like the present. It must be read in the light of the common law. "That," said Mr. Justice Bradley, in Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274, referring to the common law, "is the system from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language of the Constitution and of many acts of Congress could not be understood without reference to the common law." Again in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, is this declaration by Mr. Justice Matthews: "The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history." In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654, Mr. Justice Gray used this language:

"In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624, 625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465." See also Kepner v. United States, post, 100; 1 Kent, Com. 336.

Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England, so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were familiar with it. In this treatise, vol. 4, p. 5, is given a definition of the word "crimes:"

"A crime, or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it. This general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors; which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms; though in common usage the word 'crimes' is made to denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious

[ 195 U.S. Page 70]

     dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler name of 'midemeanors' only."

In the light of this definition we can appreciate the action of the convention which framed the Constitution. In the draft of that instrument, as reported by the committee of five, the language was "the trial of all criminal offenses. . . shall be by jury," but by unanimous vote it was amended so as to read "the trial of all crimes." The significance of this change cannot be misunderstood. If the language had remained "criminal offenses," it might have been contended that it meant all offenses of a criminal nature, petty as well as serious, but when the change was made from "criminal offenses" to "crimes," and made in the light of the popular understanding of the meaning of the word "crimes," as stated by Blackstone, it is obvious that the intent was to exclude from the constitutional requirement of a jury the trial of petty criminal offenses. But we need not go beyond the express rulings of this court. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, reference was made to many decisions of state courts, holding that the trial of petty offenses was not within any constitutional provision requiring a jury in the trial of crimes, and on page 557 it was said:

"Except in that class or grade of offenses called petty offenses, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offense charged."

By section 563, Rev. Stat., the District Courts are given jurisdiction "of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the high seas, the punishment of which is not capital." There is no act of Congress requiring that

[ 195 U.S. Page 71]

     the trial of all offenses shall be by jury, and a court is fully organized and competent for the transaction of business without the presence of a jury. There is no public policy which forbids the waiver of a jury in the trial of petty offenses. On the contrary, by section 44 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia, Congress provided, in respect to the Police Court, that --

"In all prosecutions within the jurisdiction of said court in which, according to the Constitution of the United States, the accused would be entitled to a jury trial, the trial shall be by jury, unless the accused shall in open court expressly waive such trial by jury and request to be tried by the judge, in which case the trial shall be by such judge, and the judgment and sentence shall have the same force and effect in all respects as if the same had been entered and pronounced upon the verdict of a jury. In all cases where the accused would not by force of the Constitution of the United States be entitled to a trial by jury, the trial shall be by the court without a jury, unless in such of said last named cases wherein the fine or penalty may be $50 or more, or imprisonment as punishment for the offense may be thirty days or more, the accused shall demand a trial by jury, in which case the trial shall be by jury."

And it is a well-known fact that in many Territories organized by act of Congress the legislature has authorized the prosecution of petty offenses in the police courts of cities without a jury.

But if there be no constitutional or statutory provision or public policy requiring a jury in the trial of petty offenses, upon what ground can it be contended that a defendant therein may not voluntarily waive a jury? Can it be that a defendant can plead guilty of the most serious, even a capital, offense, and thus dispense with all inquiry by a jury, and cannot when informed against for a petty offense waive a trial by jury? Article six of the amendments, as we have seen, gives the accused a right to a trial by jury. But the same article gives

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     him the further right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . and to have the assistance of counsel." Is it possible that an accused cannot admit and be bound by the admission that a witness not present would testify to certain facts? Can it be that if he does not wish the assistance of counsel and waives it, the trial is invalid? It seems only necessary to ask these questions to answer them. When there is no constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibiting, an accused may waive any privilege which he is given the right to enjoy. Authorities in the state courts are in harmony with this thought. In Commonwealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush. 80, the defendant in a misdemeanor case waived his right to a full panel and consented to be tried by eleven jurors, and this action was sustained by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. Chief Justice Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, said (p. 83): "He may waive any matter of form or substance, excepting only what may relate to the jurisdiction of the court." The same doctrine was laid down in Murphy v. Commonwealth, 1 Met. (Ky.) 365; Tyra v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 1, and in State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa, 578. In Connelly v. State, 60 Alabama, 89, a statute authorizing the waiver of a jury was sustained. The same rule was made in State v. Worden, 46 Connecticut, 349, which was a case of a felony. See also People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509, 542.

We are of opinion that the waiver of a jury by the defendants in these cases and the consent to trial by the court was not in conflict with law, and the judgments are, therefore,

Affirmed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BROWN and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM concur in the views expressed in this opinion, although they dissent from the judgments on the ground of their dissent in McCray v. United States, ante, p. 64.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.

These are criminal prosecutions based on the act of Congress

[ 195 U.S. Page 73]

     of August 2, 1886, entitled "An act defining butter, also imposing a tax upon and regulating the manufacture, sale, importation and exportation of oleomargarine," supplemented by the act of October 1, 1890, and amended by the act of May 9, 1902. 24 ...


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