ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The general question involved in the case is, whether the land in dispute is a part of surveys 149 to 156, inclusive, in the common fields of Prairie du Pont, with the accretion thereto, situate on the Illinois side of the Mississippi River, in St. Clair County, Illinois, and is owned by the plaintiff, or whether it is owned by the surviving defendant, the city of St. Louis, as an accretion to, and part of, an island in that city, called "Arsenal Island" or "Quarantine Island," on the western or Missouri side of the Mississippi River, which was originally an island more than a mile higher up the river than the surveys in question.
The assignments of error made are, that the Circuit Court, erred (1) in holding that the title and ownership of the plaintiff extended to the middle of the main channel of the Mississippi River and embraced the premises in controversy; and (2) in refusing to hold that the premises in controversy were an accretion to Arsenal Island, and the property of the city of St. Louis.
We cannot review the action of the Circuit Court in finding the facts which it did find and refusing to find the facts which it was asked to find and did not find. We can only inquire whether the facts found are sufficient to support the judgment. The "defendants' refused declarations of law" do not appear to have been based upon the facts found by the court but upon the defendants' proposed findings of fact, which were rejected by the court. These "refused declarations of law" contained mixed questions of law and fact; and where
such questions are submitted to the court in a trial without a jury, this court will not, on a writ of error, review such questions, any more than it will pure questions of fact.
The question as to whether the fee of the plaintiff, as a riparian proprietor on the Mississippi River, extends to the middle thread of the stream, or only to the water's edge, is a question in regard to a rule of property, which is governed by the local law of Illinois. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338; St. Louis v. Myers, 113 U.S. 566; Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661. In Barney v. Keokuk it is said, that if the States "choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for others to raise objections."
The Supreme Court of Illinois has established and steadily maintained, as a rule of property, that the fee of the riparian owner of lands in Illinois bordering on the Mississippi River. extends to the middle line of the main channel of that river. Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scammon, 510; Braxon v. Bressler, 64 Illinois, 488; Houck v. Yates, 82 Illinois, 179; Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 Illinois, 331; Lavalle v. Strobel, 89 Illinois, 370; Washington Ice Company v. Shortall, 101 Illinois, 46; Village of Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 Illinois, 429, 438; Trustees of Schools v. Schroll, 120 Illinois, 509, 518, 519; Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Company, 123 Illinois, 535, 550.
The findings of fact by the court make no specific reference to a deed dated December 23, 1873, from Augustus A. Blumenthal and wife to the plaintiff and others, the substance of which is set forth in the bill of exceptions, but state merely that Blumenthal acquired by deeds the title in fee to surveys 149 to 156, and that the plaintiff acquired from Blumenthal "his said title to said land prior to the commencement of this suit."
The defendant, however, refers to the deed of December 23, 1873, and relies upon the fact that the description of the premises contained in it describes the line between surveys 148 and 149 as running north 33 1/2 degrees west, 142.51 chains "to the present bank of the Mississippi River," thence along the extended line between surveys 148 and 149, north 33 1/2 degrees
west, "to low-water mark of the Mississippi River," and "thence down to the extended line between surveys" 156 and 157. The description further says: "The tract hereby conveyed containing 500 acres, more or less; together with all rights as riparian owner to the accretion or sand-bar lying northwestwardly and between the extended lines of said land herein described, situated in the county of St. Clair and State of Illinois." The deed also describes the property conveyed as "being the northwestern part of surveys numbered" 149 to 156, both inclusive, in the Prairie du Pont common fields.
The contention of the defendant is, that this deed did not convey to the grantees the fee of the bed of the river beyond low-water mark. But we think this contention is erroneous. In construing the deed, all the words of the description must be given effect, if possible. The property conveyed is described as "the northwestern part of surveys" numbered 149 to 156. This makes it impossible that the grantor should retain the ownership of any part of the surveys northwest of that which he conveyed to his grantees. Again, the description, after saying "to low-water mark of the Mississippi River," does not say "thence down low-water mark to the extended line between surveys" 156 and 157 but says only "thence down to the extended line between surveys" 156 and 157. The word "down" properly means down the river. As was said in County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 64, "where the calls in a conveyance of land are for two corners at, in or on a stream or its bank, and there is an intermediate line extending from one such corner to another, the stream is the boundary, unless there is something which excludes the operation of this rule by showing that the intention of the parties was otherwise." Here the next preceding call was a point at "low-water mark of the Mississippi River," and the next call was an intermediate line "down to the extended line between survyes" 156 and 157, without specifying whether it was down the river generally or down the line of low-water mark. This description made the river the boundary of the surveys on their northwestern ends, although the termination of the last preceding call was at low-water mark of the river.
The river always had been the boundary of the surveys on their northwestern ends; and there is nothing to show that the parties to the deed intended to make anything but the river the boundary at the northwestern end of what the deed conveyed.
It is plain that the fee of Blumenthal in the surveys extended to the middle of the river; and the contention of the defendant is, that Blumenthal, instead of conveying by the deed all the land which he owned on the northwestern end of the surveys, conveyed only to low-water mark. This would be repugnant to that clause of the description which conveys "the northwestern part of surveys" 149 to 156. Then we have the description "together with all rights as riparian owner to the accretion or sand-bar lying northwestwardly and between the extended lines of said land herein described, situated in the county of St. Clair and State of Illinois." These words show that the grantor intended to convey all his riparian rights appurtenant to the surveys, "between the extended lines" of them, in the county of St. Clair; and it cannot be held, consistently with the terms of the deed, that he intended to retain to himself any interest in the fee of the bed of the river. The accretion or sand-bar mentioned in the deed evidently existed at its date, and it was the nucleus of the bar which subsequently developed into the land in dispute. If the boundary terminated at low-water mark on the margin of the river, it could not have included all the rights of the grantor as riparian owner to the accretion or sand-bar lying northwestwardly in the river opposite the surveys. Piper v. Connolly, 108 Illinois, 646.
The finding by the court that the plaintiff acquired from Blumenthal, prior to the commencement of the suit, Blumenthal's title to the premises in question, which title was one in fee to such premises, acquired by him by deeds from the parties then in their actual possession as owners thereof, amounts to a finding that the accretion or sand-bar mentioned in the deed of December 23, 1873, was the same sand-bar which first appeared earlier in 1873, and which by subsequent accretions developed into the land in controversy. This finding
is conclusive to show that the land conveyed by Blumenthal was not limited by the line of low-water mark on the river. It does not appear that Blumenthal or any one claiming under him asserted any interest in the land after the making ...