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GALPIN v. PAGE.

October 1, 1873

GALPIN
v.
PAGE.



ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of California.

Philip Galpin brought an action against Lucy Page for the possession of certain real property situated in the city of San Francisco. The case was tried by the court by the stipulation of the parties without the intervention of a jury. Both parties claimed title to the premises from the same source, Franklin C. Gray, deceased, who died in the city of New York, in July, 1853, intestate, possessed of a large property in California, both real and personal. Of the real property the premises in controversy were a portion. The deceased left surviving him a widow, Matilda, of whom a posthumous child was born in December afterwards, named Franklina. By the statute of California the entire estate of the deceased vested in the widow and child in equal shares.

The plaintiff asserted title to the demanded premises through conveyances authorized by the Probate Court of the City and County of San Francisco, which administered upon the estate of the deceased. The defendant claimed title under a purchaser who bought at a commissioner's sale had under a decree of the District Court of the State rendered in an action brought to settle the affairs of an alleged copartnership between the deceased and others. It was admitted that the plaintiff acquired the title unless it had previously passed to the purchaser at the commissioner's sale. It was, therefore, upon the validity of the decree in the District Court and the consequent sale and deed of the commissioner that the present case was to be determined.

The action in which that decree was rendered arose in this wise: In February, 1854, William H. Gray, a brother of the deceased, brought a suit in equity in the District Court of the State (which embraced at the time the city of San Francisco), against Joseph C. Palmer and Cornelius J. Eaton, who had been appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased, and against the widow, Matilda, and James Gray, the father of the deceased. In his bill the complainant alleged that a copartnership had existed between himself and the deceased, which embraced commercial business in which the latter was engaged, and the purchase and sale of real estate; that the copartnership business was carried on, and the titles of the real property purchased were taken in the individual name of the deceased, but that the complainant was interested in all its business and property to the extent of one-third. The object of the suit was to have the affairs of the alleged copartnership settled, and to obtain a decree awarding one-third of its property to the complainant.

The allegation of the bill that a dormant and universal copartnership had existed between the complainant and the deceased was without any just foundation in fact, for, as hereinafter mentioned, it was afterwards held by the Supreme Court of the State to be unsupported by the evidence in the case.

The bill omitted to make the child, Franklina, a party, and accordingly, in June following, a supplemental or amendatory bill was filed by the complainant, referring to the original bill, and stating the birth of the child, that she was entitled to share in the estate of the deceased, and that she was absent from the State, a resident with her mother in Brooklyn, in the State of New York, and praying that she might be made a party defendant, that a guardian ad litem might be appointed for her, and that the complainant might have the same relief prayed in the original bill.

Subsequently an order was made by the court directing service of the summons upon the new defendant by publication. It was preceded by a recital that it appeared to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant resided out of the State, and that she was a necessary party to the action. It was not stated in the order in what way the facts recited appeared. It seemed probable that the court might have acted upon the statements of the supplemental complaint. The statute of the State, which authorizes constructive service by publication, is as follows:

'When the person on whom the service is to be made resides out of the State, or has departed from the State, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State, or conceals himself to avoid the service of summons, and the fact shall appear by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or a judge thereof, or a county judge, and it shall in like manner appear that a cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, or that he is a necessary or property party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that the service be made by the publication of the summons.'*fn1

In December following, upon the petition of the plaintiff, a guardian ad litem was appointed for the child. The other defendants appeared by attorneys and answered.

In January, 1855, Eaton, who had been a clerk of the deceased, and who, as administrator, was made defendant in the above action of Gray, resigned his trust and commenced a suit in the District Court of the State against Palmer, the remaining administrator, and against the widow and child. In his bill he also alleged that a copartnership had existed between him and the deceased, that such copartnership embraced all the business and real estate transactions of the deceased, and that his interest in the partnership and its property was one-fourth.

In this action publication was made of the summons issued against the defendant, Franklina, but it nowhere appeared in the record that any application was ever made to the court or judge thereof for an order directing the publication, or that any such order was ever made. So far as appeared from the record it was the voluntary act of the complainant without judicial authority or sanction. The Supreme Court afterwards held that no sufficient service was ever made of the summons issued. In September following, after the publication thus made, upon application of the complainant, the same person was appointed guardian ad litem for the infant defendant in this action, who had previously been appointed such guardian ad litem in the other action. The other defendants appeared by attorney and answered.

On the 23d of October following, upon the stipulation of the guardian thus appointed and the attorneys of the other defendants, the two actions were consolidated into one. Four days subsequently a decree was entered in this consolidated action, and from a certificate of the judge appended to the decree, it would seem to have been entered without trial and by consent and agreement of the parties. By this decree it was adjudged that a copartnership had existed between Eaton and the deceased, which embraced all the property, real and personal, and all the business of each of them, and that in this copartnership Eaton had an interest of one-fourth; that there had also existed at the same time a copartnership between Gray and the deceased, which also embraced all the property, real and personal, and all the business of each, and that in this copartnership Gray had an interest of one-third; that the latter copartnership was subject to the copartnership with Eaton, and that, therefore, Eaton should take one-fourth of the estate, and Gray one-third of the remaining three-fourths, and that the residue should be equally divided between the widow and child. By the decree a reference was also ordered to a commissioner to take and state an account of the business profits and property of the two copartnerships, with directions upon the confirmation of his report to sell all the property, real and personal, of both copartnerships, and upon the confirmation of the sales to execute proper conveyances to the purchasers.

The commissioner stated an account as required, his report was confirmed, and by a decree of the court, made in April, 1856, a sale of the entire property of the two alleged copartnerships was ordered. The sale was had under this decree in May following. At that sale the premises in controversy were bid off by Gwyn Page, one of the attorneys of the plaintiff, Gray, and to him the commissioner executed a deed. Page subsequently sold and conveyed an undivided half of the premises to J. B. Crockett, his law partner, also one of the attorneys of the plaintiff, Gray, and the latter in June, 1863, conveyed his interest to Lucy Page, the defendant in the case. The interest of Gwyn Page in the remaining half passed by devise to the defendant.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State the decree of the District Court was, at the October Term of 1857, reversed, on the ground that no sufficient service of summons was made upon the infant, Franklina, under the statute, in the case of Eaton against Palmer, and that until such service no guardian ad litem could be appointed for her; and on the further ground that the evidence presented had not established a copartnership between William H. Gray and the deceased. The case was accordingly remanded to the District Court, and afterwards both suits were dismissed.

The Circuit Court gave judgment in the suit below for the defendant, and the plaintiff thereupon brought the case here on writ of error. In its opinion, which accompanied the record, and in which the Circuit Court went into an elaborate argument to show that the District Court of California had, when its decree was rendered, apparently, jurisdiction, the Circuit Court held that the record in the State court could not be attacked collaterally unless it affirmatively showed that the court did not have jurisdiction. Its language was as follows:

'The record in the consolidated action is here attacked collaterally, and not on appeal, or in a direct proceeding of any kind to reverse, set aside, or vacate the decree. The rule is different in the two cases. When attacked collaterally it is not enough that the record does not affirmatively show jurisdiction, but, on the contrary, it must affirmatively show that the court did not have jurisdiction, or the decree will be valid until reversed on appeal, or vacated on some direct proceeding taken for that purpose.'

Mr. Galpin, plaintiff in error, in propri a person a:

The court below erred in holding that the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction cannot be attacked collaterally, except for matters apparent on the record, and that in the absence of matters affirmatively disclosing a want of jurisdiction the judgment is conclusive; in other words, in holding that the record imports such absolute verity that it can never be contradicted or questioned collaterally.

One illustration will show that the doctrine is not sound, or at any rate is subject to exceptions. Suppose a judgment is rendered against a party by publication of summons, and property sold under it, could not the heirs of the party defend against an ejectment brought by the purchaser, by showing that the party had been dead years before the suit was commenced, and that his estate, including the property in question, had been administered upon and settled? Would it be pretended in any court that the record imported such absolute verity that it must be taken as true that the party was at the time alive, even though courts in other States had pronounced him dead, and had distributed his effects accordingly? All rules of evidence are intended to secure justice, and to hold the record conclusive in such a case would make the general rule of presumption with respect to judgments of superior courts of general jurisdiction, which is a wise one when property applied, an instrument of monstrous wrong and injustice.

Take another case: A probate court on evidence deemed sufficient adjudges a man dead, and administers his estate. Although an inferior court, when it once gets jurisdiction, its proceedings are entitled to the same presumptions in their favor as the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction. Having acquired jurisdiction apparently–that is, the jurisdictional fact being declared established–property is sold by the decree of the court. Now, would it not be competent for a purchaser from the man adjudged to be dead to show, in a suit brought by the purchaser under the decree of the court, that the man was alive all the time, and to make bodily profert of him in court? or must the doctrine of the court below prevail, and the man be held to be dead notwithstanding his vocal disclaimer?

Such cases show the error of the ruling of the court below. The true doctrine is that the jurisdictional fact must always be open to inquiry; for if the court has in truth no jurisdiction, it cannot cut off inquiry into its authority.

In Williamson v. Berry,*fn2 the Supreme Court of the United States says:

'We concur that neither orders nor decrees in chancery can be reviewed as a whole in a collateral way. But it is an equally well-settled rule in jurisprudence, that the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject, may be inquired into in every other court, when the proceedings in the former are relied upon, and brought before the latter, by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. The rule prevails whether the decree or judgment has been given in a court of admiralty, chancery, ecclesiastical court or court of common law, or whether the point ruled has arisen under the laws of nations, the practice in chancery, or the municipal laws of States.'

In support of this doctrine numerous cases are cited.*fn3

In Starbuck v. Murray,*fn4 Marcy, J., dissipates the doctrine contended for in the court below; and in that case there was an allegation that the party had appeared. There is nothing of that kind here. He says:

'But it is strenuously contended that if other matter may be pleaded by the defendant, he is estopped from asserting anything against the allegation contained in the record. It imports perfect verity, it is said, and the parties to it cannot be heard to impeach it. It seems to me that this proposition assumes the very proposition to be established which is the only question in issue. For what purpose does the defendant question the jurisdiction of the court? Solely to show that its proceedings and judgments are void, and therefore the supposed record is not in truth a record. If the defendant had not proper notice of, and did not appear to the original action, all the State courts with one exception agree in opinion that the paper introduced as to him is no record; but if he cannot show even against the pretended record that fact, on the alleged ground of the uncontrollable verity of the record, he is deprived of his defence by a process of reasoning that is to my mind little less than sophistry. The plaintiff in effect declares to the ...


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